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Foreword 
 
 
Over the past year, the virtual meetings of the ‘Future Europe’ forum have provided a unique 
opportunity for discussing how to render the governance of the euro area more robust. This 
volume collects a range of contributions by high level experts on many technical aspects. 
Different contributors have sometimes come to different conclusions. But what is common to 
all is the search for a more resilient euro area with solutions based on sound economic 
principles, rather than political expediency or prejudices.   
I hope these contributions will, in their diversity, help lead to better decision making as our 
political leaders have recognised that the time has come to take concrete steps to make the 
euro fit for an increasingly challenging economic environment. 
It has been a privilege to exchange ideas with such a diverse and high-powered group of 
researchers and thought leaders and I trust the readers of this ebook will value their insights. 
 
Daniel Gros 
Director, CEPS 
June 2018 
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Foreword 
 
 
Economic growth is comprehensively and, in some parts, even strongly returning to the 
eurozone. Fears for the survival of the euro that predominated previously have dispelled. 
However, this is only one aspect of the situation in which Europe finds itself – the reality, as 
visible, for example, from recent events in Italy, is not as rosy. Unemployment in general has 
fallen, but remains a great challenge in particular for young people. Sovereign as well as private 
debt poses significant risk – not only for individual member states, but also for the eurozone as 
a whole.  
Europe stands at multiple crossroads, facing significant challenges and difficult decisions. It is 
therefore important to develop new policy proposals and to coordinate them at an 
international level. Together with the German Council of Economic Experts, ESMT formed  
the ‘Future Europe’ forum in 2017 to do just this. Over the past year, we have brought  
together top researchers and thought leaders for continuous exchanges around a wide variety 
of themes.  
The European Union is essential as a model of peace, freedom, and sound economic 
governance. With this ebook, we would like to share many of the proposals that have been 
debated in the forum. We hope to reach a greater audience and spark a much wider discussion 
around this highly important subject of a future economic model for Europe.  
 
Jörg Rocholl 
President, ESMT Berlin 
June 2018 
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Foreword 
 
 
Throughout the last few years, Europe has been involved in a lively debate about its future. 
There is no scarcity of suggestions for reform, and proposals frequently point in quite different 
directions. Unfortunately, the discussion on reform options often lacks clear and sound 
economic reasoning and is dominated by political strategies. 
Since the beginning of the crisis in the euro area, the German Council of Economic 
Experts (GCEE) has been devoted to contributing constructively to this reform debate. In 2012, 
it introduced its encompassing concept ‘Maastricht 2.0’ for a more stable architecture of the 
euro area. At least in principle, many reforms to date – the reform of the fiscal framework, the 
Banking Union and the Single Resolution Mechanism – are consistent with this framework. 
However, gaps remain. 
In addition to formulating its own suggestions, the GCEE aims at facilitating a constructive 
international debate to improve the understanding between the often fiercely opposing views 
that tend to shape the public debate. It therefore co-organised the ‘Future Europe’ forum, 
which was established to facilitate a quality debate on ideas how to further improve the 
resilience of the euro area. By bringing together a group of more than two dozen scholars and 
thinkers from eight nations, this initiative yielded a rich and multifaceted debate. 
This ebook brings this debate into the public domain, with short essays on policy proposals 
followed by summaries of the discussions at the forum. I hope you enjoy discovering these 
deliberations. 
 
Christoph M. Schmidt 
Chairman, German Council of Economic Experts 
June 2018 
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Preface 
Jochen Andritzky and Jörg Rocholl 
 
Much progress has been made in improving resilience of the single currency since the beginning 
of the crisis. But many important issues remain to be tackled. The leaders of euro-area member 
states are expected to use the European Union Summit on 28-29 June 2018 to take preliminary 
decisions about which additional reforms to pursue. The run-up to this meeting has seen a lively 
debate involving economists and policymakers, albeit against a backdrop of rising 
Euroscepticism among and waning trust between European partners. 
The setting for ‘Future Europe’  
With the help of ESMT and the German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE), we initiated the 
‘Future Europe’ forum in the summer of 2017. We wanted to bring together a high-level group 
of economists to discuss economically sensible, legally sound, and politically feasible concepts 
that deserved to be taken forward. By offering a forum for discussion, we hoped to foster 
constructive dialogue.  
We chose an innovative video-conference format to bring experts together face to face without 
them having to leave their desks (or living rooms). Some 30 economists took part in almost a 
dozen such virtual meetings, and their contributions culminated in this publication, brought out 
jointly by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), ESMT and the GCEE. 
This publication gathers summaries of these economists’ proposals and the discussions they 
sparked. Our main aim was not to produce a variant of the jointly-authored academic paper, 
but to foster a lively debate between economists who – as one participant put it – “agree 
somewhat, but not too much”. This ebook as a result combines essays outlining an individual 
author’s thoughts with summaries of the informed, impassioned, and always respectful 
discussions during each forum. While each contribution can only be attributed to the respective 
author, each idea and thought is in our view a valuable input that deserves to be considered by 
European governments as they set about the next euro-area reforms. 
The ‘Future Europe’ discussions 
Every chapter of this ebook is devoted to discussion of one issue put forward in the virtual 
meetings. For the sake of clarity, we have grouped issues into three categories - (i) fiscal and 
structural questions, (ii) banking and financial issues, and (iii) institutional matters. Readers 
should, of course, bear in mind that some of these contributions were made months ago and 
that some policy debates have progressed a lot since then. 
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Fiscal and structural issues 
Recent public debate about euro-area reforms has often revolved around mechanisms for fiscal 
stabilisation, with several proposals now on the table. Taking a step back to discuss lessons 
from the economics of insurance, Daniel Gros argued the euro area does not need to offset all 
shocks by a small fraction, but needed protection against shocks that are rare, but potentially 
catastrophic. He proposed a “stormy-day fund” as being much more useful to the euro area 
than the much discussed “rainy-day fund” – akin to a catastrophe-insurance policy with a high 
deductible. The ensuing discussion showed many participants accepted the benefits of an 
insurance mechanism in principle, but also highlighted many hurdles, like criteria for shock 
measurement, for example.  
Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest, Dirk Neumann and Andreas Peichl looked at possibilities for 
macroeconomic stabilisation by analysing different designs for a common unemployment 
insurance and their benefit for interregional smoothing. The ensuing discussion focused on the 
problem of generating sufficient smoothing benefits while avoiding quasi-permanent transfers. 
Another stumbling block was seen in the difficulty of harmonising diverse national social 
security systems, many of which also interact with national unemployment insurance.   
Besides risk sharing through a stabilisation function, participants discussed how fiscal policy 
could act as a shock absorber. The euro area’s fiscal framework, in particular the fiscal rules 
and their enforcement, had earlier been identified as a key weakness. Roel Beetsma and Eloïse 
Stéclebout-Orseau discussed different ways of fixing the fiscal framework, for example by 
reducing its pro-cyclicality, improving compliance and reducing complexity. In addition, they 
argued for an investment protection capacity. In the discussion that followed, many 
participants spoke out in favour of an expenditure rule to reduce the pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
rules, while keeping the public debt ratio as important anchor. This led to a lively discussion 
about the role of market discipline and how to deal with excessive debt. 
Sovereign debt restructuring was the topic of a contribution by Jochen Andritzky, Désirée I. 
Christofzik and Lars P. Feld. The authors called for a more credible framework for sovereign 
debt restructuring to ensure creditors participate in crisis resolution and to protect the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from lending to insolvent member states. They proposed 
a tiered approach of market-based maturity extensions when debt is high, and more thorough 
debt restructuring as needed. Participants acknowledged the need for sovereign debt 
restructuring as an instrument to make the no-bailout clause credible, but were wary of 
unintended consequences. This showed how hard it is to strike a balance between flexibility 
and credibility. 
Complementing the discussion on sovereign debt, Jeromin Zettelmeyer and Álvaro Leandro 
compared different concepts for providing safe assets in the euro area. They found that most 
criticism of European Safe Bonds (ESBies), a safe asset created by pooling and tranching 
sovereign debt, do not stand up to scrutiny, whereas some otherwise attractive alternatives 
would require some degree of member-state guarantee. The discussion revealed different 
views about the stabilising role of banks holding domestic assets, and about the contribution 
of safe assets to financial system stability.  
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Banking and financial issues 
The creation of the Banking Union highlighted the most obvious omission in the euro area’s 
initial architecture and marked the most comprehensive recent reform in the single currency 
bloc. Besides making the banking system more stable, Banking Union will reduce the sovereign-
bank ‘doom loop’. Three contributions tackled the most pressing issues that remain. 
Nicolas Véron examined bank crisis management and resolution, an essential part of Banking 
Union – and nothing less than a paradigm shift from ‘bail-out’ to ‘bail-in’, and from national to 
European decision-making. Experience with the new regime is scarce, he noted, but several 
issues had already emerged – the need to harmonise national frameworks for bank insolvency, 
for example, and to enhance the authority of the Single Resolution Board over the execution of 
resolution. All participants agreed Banking Union was a crucial step, but some worried about 
decision-making complexity and questioned whether a bail-in of senior bank debt was credible. 
Whether the European-level direct recapitalisation tool for banks is needed was hotly debated 
by participants. 
Dirk Schoenmaker made the case for a single European deposit insurance scheme to prevent 
bank runs and avoid crises endangering smaller national systems. Country- and bank-specific 
risk premia, and strict supervision with mandatory write-downs of non-performing loans would 
safeguard against moral hazard. As country-specific risk premia and abandoning country-
specific deposit insurance could be politically contentious, an alternative discussed was the 
creation of national compartments in a centrally managed deposit insurance system. They 
would take persistent national differences into account and align incentives better. Participants 
agreed that integrating deposit insurance and bank resolution could simplify crisis management 
and exploit the pooling potential of insurance. 
Dietrich Matthes and Jörg Rocholl proposed creating a euro zone basket, a formula to exempt 
part sovereign debt holdings from risk-weighting, to limit regulatory privileges for sovereign 
debt held by banks. In order to break the so-called bank-state nexus, banks would be given 
incentives to diversify sovereign debt holdings to reduce their ‘home bias’ – the practice of 
holding large exposures of the sovereign debt of the country in which they are headquartered. 
While possibly a politically palatable way to address the issue of zero risk weighting of sovereign 
exposures, some participants said only the introduction of a safe asset would encourage banks 
to diversify their sovereign debt holdings. But there was wide agreement that diversifying 
sovereign holdings would reduce overall risks and weaken the bank-state ‘doom loop’.  
Beyond completing Banking Union, policymakers were also encouraged to improve risk sharing 
through capital markets. In a forum on Capital Markets Union, Diego Valiante called for better 
availability and comparability of data from areas like accounting and credit reporting, and 
stronger enforcement tools in common supervision and insolvency proceedings. A slew of other 
issues was raised in the discussion, suggesting there are many political landmines and no one 
silver bullet. Progress could be slow and hinge on further integration of the European economy. 
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Institutional issues 
Aside from fiscal and financial issues, institutional reform is an important element as it is an 
instrument of deeper political integration. In the forum, we focused our attention on two issues 
– enlarging the mandate of the ESM and establishing a euro-area finance minister. 
Jochen Andritzky argued a stronger and more credible crisis mechanism would allow for private 
risk sharing. It would, in his view, boost investor confidence that financial turmoil would be less 
frequent and less disruptive. A preventive facility could be a new financial backstop for member 
states that adhere to sound economic policies. Second, the crisis facility could be reformed to 
couple more credible creditor participation with longer programme adjustment periods and 
more gradual fiscal consolidation. The discussion revealed a variety of views about the ESM’s 
role. The idea of tiered assistance depending on country size, policies, and origin of the shock 
obtained some plaudits, while also a strengthened role for the ESM in banking crises received 
broader support.  
Guntram Wolff discussed the European Commission’s proposal to establish a European finance 
minister, who would be Commission Vice President, chair of the Eurogroup, and in charge of 
the euro-area portion of the EU budget. He concluded such a position would be institutionally 
and politically ill conceived. Instead, the current Eurogroup chair should be strengthened and 
accountability to the European Parliament increased. Participants were sceptical whether this 
could deliver better ‘technocratic’ decisions or have any real influence in the absence of powers 
to tax, borrow, or spend. Participants thought it unlikely that member states would relinquish 
any national sovereignty, but agreed the independent European Fiscal Board should be 
strengthened. 
The outlook 
The euro-area crisis threw a stark light on flaws in the euro’s architecture and national policies. 
Much has improved since and, even if things stay as they are, any claims that the euro is 
destined to fail now sound farfetched. No economic or monetary union can ever be perfect. 
But the crisis has left deep scars, damaging trust and elevating fears about moral hazard. For 
some, euro-area members did not show enough solidarity. For others, this invocation of 
standing together was no more than a call to pay for others’ mistakes. Crisis legacies like high 
public debt and battered bank balance sheets have cast a pall on the idea of more risk sharing. 
The outlook is challenging. The upswing has reduced risks and restored convergence, but it will 
be insufficient to heal all ills. Recent reforms of the euro-area architecture were well intended, 
although their litmus test in the form of another severe downturn is still pending. Moreover, 
the rise in the number of Eurosceptic voters has fuelled fears of rising exit risk, undermining 
deeper integration, and damaging the prospects of more convergence and greater resilience. 
A European deposit insurance system, for example, cannot prevent bank runs driven by fears of 
a euro exit. The euro area will probably have to deal with a number of such flutters in the future.  
The discussions in the ‘Future Europe’ forum revealed many trade-offs that will prove tough to 
evaluate as policymakers plan further reforms. The public and political debate about policy 
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options often does not reach the depth of economic arguments. Our forum wants to alert the 
public to an economic debate that grapples with fundamental concepts like incentive effects. 
At the same time, participants kept in mind political feasibility, often a reflection of differing 
voter preferences. Despite the different opinions that came to light, our discussions showed a 
deep recognition of the achievements that have enabled the countries of Europe to close ranks 
with conviction. 
We hope this will make our ebook a fascinating read, one that will lead to a better mutual 
understanding and spur a more constructive public debate about the steps that lie ahead for 
us all. We would like to thank all the contributors – the authors of the essays, the participants 
in the discussions, as well as those institutions and individuals who supported this project. 
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1 A fiscal shock absorber for the euro area? 
Rationale and insights from the economics 
of insurance (and reinsurance) 
Daniel Gros 
CEPS 
Most proposals aimed at reform of the governance of the euro area include a call for a fiscal 
stabilisation fund or mechanism to absorb shocks. Recent examples include the IMF proposal 
for a ‘rainy-day’ fund (Arnold et al., 2018), the speech of the French President at the Sorbonne 
(Macron, 2017), the December 2017 proposals of the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2017) and earlier official reports (European Council, 2012). 
The literature from academia and think tanks has also provided many concrete proposals for 
such mechanisms. These mechanisms usually foresee that a certain percentage of each up or 
down in the economy is offset by payments to (or from) a central fund (see Dullien, 2013 and 
Enderlein, 2013) and, 20 years earlier, Pisani-Ferry et al., 1993) for examples).  
But this approach neglects a key insight from the economics of insurance, namely that 
protection against large shocks, even if they are rare, is much more valuable than protection 
against small shocks, even if they are more frequent. 
Insurance and convexity  
Insurance is useful when the cost of a shock is convex, i.e. when a shock of twice the magnitude 
of previous one causes more than twice the damage. The case for insurance at the 
microeconomic level is usually simply that utility functions are assumed to be concave (and 
hence the cost of losing income becomes convex). The same reasoning could of course also be 
applied directly to macroeconomic fluctuations. 
But the euro crisis has vividly illustrated another reason why the cost of large shocks can be more 
than proportionally large. The key mechanism is that large shocks can impair access to financial 
markets. In this case, consumption smoothing is no longer possible, or becomes very expensive.  
Moreover, the case of Greece has shown that the social cost of very large, ‘catastrophic’ shocks 
can be immense because a shock that leads to insolvency creates a host of other problems, 
including widespread bankruptcy. By contrast, the small fluctuations that were prevalent during 
the ‘Great Moderation’ did not involve large costs, as temporary shocks to output or income 
could be smoothed at a low cost via savings or borrowing in the capital market. 1 
                                                     
1 There is some confusion in the literature on the purpose of shock absorbers. In principle, the ultimate motive for 
insurance should be to smooth consumption over time. But most empirical analysis concentrates on the variability 
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There are thus good reasons why social loss functions are assumed to be convex. Most optimal 
control models simply assume a special form of convexity, namely that the social loss function 
is quadratic in output (or output compared to its equilibrium level; see Blanchard and Fischer, 
1996). A simple way in which this functional form can arise in reality could be observed during 
the euro crisis, when large shocks to output had an immediate impact on the fiscal deficit and 
the interest rate on government debt increased with the deficit (or public debt).2 There are 
thus practical reasons to believe that large shocks can have very large costs. 
A first line of defence against this type of problem is to adopt a prudent fiscal policy and 
maintain a low level of debt. But the crisis even engulfed countries that had run fiscal surpluses 
and had rather low levels of public debt at the start of the crisis, such as Ireland and Spain. ‘Self-
insurance’ is thus not enough. But then what type of insurance is needed? 
Insurance with deductible first-best  
A widespread practice in the insurance industry is to offer clients full coverage only above a 
certain deductible or threshold. This approach should be applied to the discussion about the 
need for a shock absorber for the euro area as well. 
The basic idea behind insurance with a deductible is illustrated in Figure 1. The usual quadratic 
social loss function (blue line) is shown as the square of the shock that is hitting the economy 
(e.g. the increase in unemployment or the fall in GDP) on the horizontal axis. This represents 
the shock to which the economy would be subject in the absence of an insurance mechanism. 
With a (partial) shock absorber, which offsets a certain percentage of the shock (as proposed 
by Enderlein, 2013), the welfare impact of all shocks is lower, as indicated by the red line. 
An alternative to a shock absorber is to introduce a deductible, but to fully compensate all 
shocks registering above that threshold. The resulting welfare loss as a function of the shock is 
indicated by the green line (where the threshold was set at 1). 
The actuarially fair price for both types of insurance will of course depend on the parameters of the 
probability density function of the shocks, the percentage of the shock absorbed and the deductible. 
The difference between the welfare losses under the two approaches can be discerned in 
Figure 1 as the difference between the areas between the green and the red lines to the left 
and to the right of the point where they meet. The example drawn in this figure suggests that 
the area to the right is much larger, but the two areas must be weighted by the probability of 
these shocks occurring. It thus seems that, a priori, it is not possible to determine in general 
whether a proportional shock absorber or an insurance contract with a deductible is superior.3  
                                                     
of income (GDP). Asdrubali et al. (1996) are one of the few to analyse how variations in income are transmitted to 
variations in consumption. Furcieri and Zdzienicka (2013) build their proposal on this approach. 
2 Benigno and Woodford (2004) derive this functional form more generally; for a critique, see Mayer (2002). 
3 Formally, the actuarially fair cost of a shock absorber under which a fraction alpha of any shock, x, is absorbed 
by the insurer is given by alpha E(x). This cost is then set against the reduction in the expected welfare loss through 
the insurance pay-outs.  
With a quadratic loss function, one can calculate the following expected losses:  
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However, Arrow (1974) advanced a general theorem that insurance with a deductible is 
superior. He proved that “if we stay within the class of contracts with the same expected loss, 
EU (=expected utility) maximisers prefer a contract with full (100%) insurance above a fixed 
deductible.”4 
Figure 1. Welfare loss with a (partial) shock absorber vs insurance with deductible 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The same principle also applies within the insurance industry itself. Most insurance companies 
take out so-called reinsurance against very large claims.5 The underlying reason is that a normal 
insurance company is risk-neutral for any small claim. A very large claim, however, could impair 
the company’s access to financial markets and might even put its survival in danger, thus 
                                                     
- No shock absorber: the welfare loss would be proportional to the variance of the shock, i.e. E(x2).  
- Shock absorber: the welfare loss would be proportional to the variance of the shock attenuated by the fraction 
alpha, or (1-alpha)2*E(x2).  
- Insurance with deductible: the welfare loss would be given by the sum of two elements. For a shock smaller than 
the deductible (indicated by gamma), one has to take the expected value of x2, but for larger shocks (i.e. x>gamma), 
the welfare loss will be just equal to gamma2 (which has to be multiplied by the probability that x>gamma).
  
The welfare gain from the (proportional) shock absorber can be calculated as the difference between its cost 
(=alpha E(x)) and the reduction in welfare losses (=E(x2) -(1-alpha)2*E(x2)). 
4 See Russel (2004). See also Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) for a more general version of the theorem concerning 
the optimality of full insurance above some fixed deductible. 
5 Not all reinsurance contracts specify 100% coverage for losses above the threshold. But insurance companies usually 
try to cover themselves fully against catastrophic losses, even if this entails more than a reinsurance contract. 
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implying very large losses for the shareholders. In this case, the convexity might not be of the 
usual quadratic form, but the general principle of insurance becoming useful when costs are 
convex nevertheless applies. 
An illustration: Normally distributed shocks 
The advantage of insurance with a deductible over the shock absorber (with the same 
premium) can be illustrated graphically using the most widely used functional form concerning 
the distribution of shocks, namely that they are normally distributed. This is often a convenient 
assumption to solve linear quadratic problems, but it has the disadvantage that no analytical 
solution exists for the normal (Gaussian) distribution (or probability density function) for the 
truncated variances and expected values that one needs in order to evaluate the comparative 
welfare losses and the actuarially fair cost of providing either a shock absorber or an insurance 
contract with a deductible.6 
Figure 2 below thus shows the numerical values of the difference between the welfare loss 
under a shock absorber and insurance with a deductible as a function of the deductible in terms 
of the standard deviation of the distribution of the shock. The size of the shock absorber was 
adjusted in each case so that the actuarially fair price of both contracts was the same.  
It is apparent from Figure 2 that the difference is always positive, i.e. the welfare loss is always 
lower under an insurance contract with a deductible, as proven more generally by Arrow (1974). 
Figure 2 also illustrates a general property of insurance with a deductible. The value of such an 
insurance contract depends on the size of the deductible: if it is zero, the contract provides full 
insurance; if the deductible is infinity, there is no insurance at all. This also implies that the 
difference between a shock absorber and insurance with a deductible must go towards zero as 
the deductible goes to zero (in this case, the shock absorber will have to go to full shock 
absorption), and it must go again to zero as the deductible goes towards infinity. At that point, 
there will be little difference between the two types of insurance because the (actuarially 
equivalent) proportional pay-out would go towards zero.  
For the case considered here, i.e. the shock is distributed according to a standardised Gaussian 
model, Figure 2 shows that insurance with a deductible offers the most advantageous coverage 
if the deductible is equal to one (one standard deviation). In other words, an insurance contract 
with a deductible equal to one standard deviation of the shock is more advantageous than a 
proportional shock absorber.  
                                                     
6 Another drawback of the normal distribution is that reality has ‘fat tails’, i.e. large events materialise more often 
than one would expect if the distribution were normal. 
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Figure 2. Difference in social welfare losses between a proportional shock absorber and 
reinsurance (=insurance with a deductible) 
 
Source: Own calculations.  
Conclusions 
Many observers and policy-makers are now arguing that the euro area needs to introduce a 
system of fiscal shock absorbers to protect itself against shocks. The experience of the US is 
often cited as a key justification for such a proposal. For example, two studies by the IMF (2013a 
and 2013b) find that about 20% of shocks to state income are offset by the US federal fiscal 
system. But such a system would have been of limited value in the euro crisis: offering a country 
whose output falls by 1% (relative to the euro area average) a transfer of 0.2% of its GDP would 
be of very limited usefulness. A country hit by a very large shock, say 5% of GDP (like Portugal 
or Ireland), would of course receive a larger transfer, but the problems would not be 
substantially different (a fall of income by 4% instead of 5%). By contrast, in an insurance system 
with a deductible of say 1% of GDP, the country hit by a small shock would receive nothing. But 
most of the large shock would be offset (fully above the 1% deductible).  
In short, what the euro area really needs is not a system that offsets all shocks by some small 
fraction, but a system that protects against shocks that are rare, but potentially catastrophic. 
The many minor cyclical shocks that do not impair the functioning of financial markets can then 
be dealt with via borrowing at the national level. The euro area’s rescue mechanism, the 
European Stability Mechanism, does not provide this much-needed insurance function. It gives 
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only loans, which must be repaid with interest, whereas insurance provides a transfer when a 
shock materialises (against premium payments during good times). 
One way to create an insurance programme with a deductible would be to launch a system of 
reinsurance for national unemployment insurance systems, under which the national systems 
would pay regular premia to a central euro area fund (see the contribution by Mathias Dolls, 
Clemens Fuest, Dirk Neumann and Andreas Peichl in the following chapter). Gros (2013) 
proposes that this reinsurance principle could be applied in the area of deposit insurance, which 
could remain in the first instance national. In the event that a large banking crisis led to losses 
that exceed the fiscal capacity of the national government, the European fund could then be 
activated to support the national deposit guarantee system.  
Proposals for ‘rainy day’ funds often contain elements of reinsurance in the sense that 
countries only qualify for pay-out if they experience a recession or downturn (for a useful 
overview, see Arnold et al., 2018). But in most cases the pay-out is only proportional to the 
downturn. This is different from the basic idea of insurance with a deductible under which there 
is no pay-out for small (negative) shocks, but a potentially very large one if the magnitude of 
the shock exceeds a specified threshold. The analysis here suggests that the latter is more 
important. 
In other words, ‘stormy-day’ funds are superior to ‘rainy-day’ funds. 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 25 September 2017 
Presentation by Daniel Gros, discussion led by Jeromin Zettelmeyer and Roberto Perotti 
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Mathias Dolls Ifo Institute 
Daniel Gros Centre for European Policy Studies 
Roberto Perotti Bocconi University 
Pietro Reichlin LUISS Guido Carli University 
Jörg Rocholl ESMT Berlin 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer and Roberto Perotti agreed broadly with the case for a re-insurance 
mechanism, with the former recalling its benefits for fiscal stabilisation at the zero lower bound. 
A mechanism as outlined would also go some way to address moral hazard concerns. However, 
the implementation of a re-insurance mechanism could be tricky: the system would need to be 
calibrated and variables such as deductibles and risk premiums vary between countries and 
over time.  
Roberto Perotti added that the output gap remains a black box in the eyes of many, and – as 
the experience of determining structural unemployment in Italy during the 2012 episode shows 
– can be subject to disputes. He also pointed out that – if there were a fiscal equalisation 
mechanism in the euro area – payments would mostly have flown one way which would likely 
be politically unsustainable.  
Daniel Gros responded that safeguards are in place to avoid a permanent transfer. In particular, 
a rating system could be used that determines the risk premium to be paid. He pointed out 
simulations indicating that normally no large one-way transfer would have occurred. The 
mechanism would just lead to payouts in response to changes, not shifts in levels. Similar to an 
insurance policy, the risk premium would go up after the payouts, so over a long period there 
would not be transfers. The beauty of the approach is that – given the country-specific 
calibration, experience rating and response to changes – there does not need to be a major 
harmonisation of national unemployment systems. 
Jochen Andritzky asked why such a system could not be established as private sector solution 
or as an optional mechanism to which member countries could sign up voluntarily. Another 
question is whether incentives remain to make the loss function more convex, for instance by 
making the labour market less flexible. Daniel Gros responded that well-known market 
insufficiencies explained why there is no private sector solution. He also emphasised the 
advantage of pooling a larger number of countries. Jeromin Zettelmeyer added that risk 
premiums could be calibrated to individual risk to address different convexities of the loss 
function. 
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Pietro Reichlin compared the mechanism to the ESM or deficit financing. Given that the ESM 
lends at concessional terms, it mimics a re-insurance mechanism. He also shared the concerns 
about the political viability of such a mechanism. Depending on the calibration, other 
simulations have shown that Italy would have been a net payer and Germany would have been 
a net receiver. He would prefer to develop the ESM towards becoming a European Monetary 
Fund and facilitate market integration, including through EDIS. Daniel Gros emphasised that 
such a mechanism would not substitute for the ESM. However, as opposed to ESM lending, the 
mechanism could avoid a situation where ESM loans aggravate debt overhang. 
Jörg Rocholl wondered whether the best application would indeed be unemployment 
insurance. Daniel Gros referred to his work on EDIS, which would be a primary application. 
Jochen Andritzky proposed a loan instead of a grant as payout, with the decision to be taken 
later whether the situation was a cyclical shock or something more structural. If such a system 
could be made credible, markets would internalise the fact that the loan could turn into a grant. 
Daniel Gros said that there does not need to be a distinction between permanent and cyclical 
given the payments are based on changes, not shifts in levels of unemployment. Also, higher 
risk premiums would compensate for any payouts over time. Jeromin Zettelmeyer thought it 
may still be a relevant point given differences in the volatility of unemployment rates.  
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The eurozone debt crisis has revived the debate about institutional reforms in the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and has elevated this topic to the top of the European 
policy agenda. Some observers argue that deeper fiscal integration is necessary to avoid the 
break-up of the eurozone. In line with this view, institutions like the IMF or the European 
Commission have outlined proposals including stronger elements of fiscal risk sharing and a 
macroeconomic stabilisation function at euro area level.1 A widely discussed reform proposal 
is a common unemployment insurance (UI) scheme. Supporters argue that a centralised EMU-
UI system would cushion asymmetric shocks in the eurozone and provide income insurance to 
the most vulnerable households. It would thus improve economic resilience within the EMU 
and strengthen the social dimension of European policy-making (Andor, 2014, Lellouch and 
Sode, 2014, MEF, 2016). However, the main concerns relate to the issues of permanent 
transfers across member states undermining the credibility of the no-bailout clause and moral 
hazard for national economic policies, administrations, and individuals. These adverse incentive 
effects would lead to more, rather than less unemployment. 
This contribution2 presents new research findings on the stabilising and redistributive effects 
of a common unemployment insurance scheme for the euro area (henceforth EMU-UI). It 
provides insights regarding its potential added value and discusses moral hazard issues. We 
argue that the added value of common unemployment insurance as a fiscal risk sharing device 
hinges on its ability to provide interregional smoothing. Other potential stabilisation effects of 
EMU-UI, such as improved counter-cyclicality or intertemporal smoothing, can be achieved, in 
principle, by countries acting alone, for example by introducing minimum conditions for 
national UI schemes or by national debt issuance. We develop a decomposition framework that 
assesses the effectiveness of different EMU-UI schemes in acting as an automatic stabiliser. 
                                                     
1 See e.g. IMF (2018), Berger et al. (2018), or the recent European Commission “Reflection Paper on the deepening 
of the Economic and Monetary Union”, as well as its roadmap for EMU reform published in December 2017 
(European Commission 2017 a,b). 
2 A short version of Dolls et al. (2018). 
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Running counterfactual simulations based on micro data for the years 2000-13, we find that 
10% of the income fluctuations caused by transitions into and out of unemployment would 
have been cushioned through interregional smoothing at euro area level. However, smoothing 
gains are unevenly distributed across countries, ranging from -5% in Malta to 22% in Latvia. Our 
results suggest that during 2000-13 the interregional smoothing potential has been as 
important as intertemporal smoothing through debt. Our simulations also reveal that four 
member states would have been either a permanent net contributor or net recipient.  
Possible Characteristics of an EMU-UI system 
A common unemployment insurance system for the euro area could be designed in several 
ways. Two principal options have been discussed in both the academic literature and in policy 
debates so far (see Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017, Brandolini et al., 2016). A first option would be 
a common EMU-UI system that covers short-term unemployment and provides a basic level of 
insurance by partly replacing national UI systems. To limit the risk of permanent redistribution, 
and to preserve incentives for national policy-makers, long-term unemployment would not be 
covered. Benefits from the EMU-UI system could be supplemented by additional payments 
from national UI systems. This would allow for diversity across member states so that existing 
differences in replacement rates and benefit duration could be maintained. Importantly, such 
a scheme would provide direct transfers to the short-term unemployed regardless of the size 
of the unemployment shock in a given member state. As an alternative, a common scheme 
could kick-in only following large unemployment shocks. Such a contingent EMU-UI system 
could also be designed as a reinsurance scheme where national UI systems stay in place and 
there are no direct transfers from the EMU-UI system to the short-term unemployed, but 
financial flows between the European fund and national governments (Bénassy-Quéré, 2018 
and Dolls et al., 2016). A further design question relevant for both alternatives is whether the 
EMU-UI should be allowed to issue debt. If debt issuance is ruled out, one option could be to 
build up reserves during economic upswings that could then provide a buffer during recessions.  
Empirical approach and decomposition framework  
Data and methodology. In our simulation experiment, we introduce an unemployment 
insurance scheme for the EA18 member states and ask what would have happened if such a 
scheme had been introduced at the beginning of the euro in 1999. Linking micro data from the 
EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 
we construct a series of reweighted cross-sections for the simulation period which replicates 
changes in labour market conditions (such as the unemployment rate, share of short- and long-
term unemployed, and the size and composition of the labour force) in each member state. 
Critically, our approach can account for heterogeneity in various characteristics of the 
populations in different countries that macro data approaches cannot capture. We simulate 
the financial flows of different variants of an EMU-UI, which will be discussed below. 
Our analysis is based on the following assumptions: First, we do not take into account general 
equilibrium effects of an EMU-UI system, i.e., our analysis remains in a partial equilibrium 
context. Accounting for these macroeconomic feedback effects would require linking our micro 
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data to a macro-econometric simulation model. Second, we do not simulate changes in 
government behaviour or individual behavioural responses. In the light of these assumptions, 
our results should be interpreted as analysing the ‘first-round’ effects of an EMU-UI system. If 
EMU-UI had the desired stabilising effects, the financial flows in the system would differ from 
those calculated here; the redistributive effects would probably be smaller. However, if the 
moral hazard effects dominated, the financial flows from contributors to recipients could also 
be larger. 
Decomposition. We decompose the effect of introducing an EMU-UI system into three steps. 
The first is to harmonise national systems: that is all member states introduce an unemployment 
insurance scheme with common features. The second step is to introduce a common EMU-UI 
scheme by pooling the contributions from all member states in every year and to finance 
unemployment benefits from this pool using the same contribution rates in all countries. This 
leads to interregional smoothing of unemployment shocks. The third step is to allow the EMU-
UI system to run deficits or surpluses. This leads to intertemporal smoothing. 
We simulate four UI schemes, shown in Table 1, in order to isolate and quantify the importance 
of different stabilisation channels of an EMU-UI. Stabilisation is measured as the fraction of the 
income change due to employment changes within a given year that is absorbed by the UI 
system. We estimate the impact of harmonisation by comparing the stabilisation potential of 
actual national UI schemes (scheme 1) and harmonised UI schemes that fulfil certain minimum 
standards (scheme 2). As minimum conditions, we choose a replacement rate of 50% which 
roughly corresponds to the average replacement rate in Eurozone countries, a benefit duration 
of 12 months, and a broad coverage of all short-term unemployment with previous earnings. 
The simulated EMU-UI schemes (schemes 3 and 4) have the same payout rules, but a 
(geographically) widened budget. Differences in stabilisation effects between harmonised 
national UI schemes and the centralised EMU-UI scheme (scheme 3) are due to interregional 
smoothing, while intertemporal smoothing effects are singled out by comparing EMU-UI 
schemes with and without debt issuance (scheme 4). 
Table 1. Simulated UI schemes 
Simulated UI schemes Minimum 
conditions? 
Pooling of 
contributions? 
Debt 
issuance? 
1. Actual national UI schemes no no no 
2. Harmonised national UI schemes yes no no 
3. EMU-UI (balanced budget in every 
year) 
yes yes no 
4. EMU-UI (balanced budget over the 
period 2000-13) 
yes yes yes 
Notes: Actual national UI schemes (1.) as observed over the period 2000-13. We use a national UI calculator that incorporates 
all relevant policy rules of national UI systems. Harmonised national UI schemes (2.) need to fulfill certain minimum conditions, 
in particular a replacement rate of 50% and a maximum benefit duration of 12 months. Schemes 3 and 4 have the same 
generosity as scheme 2, but contributions are pooled at euro area level. 
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Results and Discussion 
Stabilising effects 
Harmonisation gains. We find substantial heterogeneity between national UI schemes 
regarding the degree of income insurance in case of unemployment. Consequently, the 
stabilisation gain for the short-term unemployed through harmonising unemployment benefits 
varies across member states and over time. However, the combined stabilisation effect of 
harmonised benefits and adjusted contributions is neutral in our analysis as more generous 
benefits lead to higher social insurance contributions.  
Smoothing gains. Our main results are presented in Table 2. As mentioned above, we find that 
the simulated EMU-UI scheme would have provided interregional smoothing gains by 
cushioning 10% of income fluctuations that are due to transitions into and out of 
unemployment at euro area level. Interregional smoothing effects are unevenly distributed 
across member states, ranging from -5% in Malta to 22% in Latvia. Overall, 17 out of 18 member 
states would have been stabilised through interregional smoothing. At the same time we find 
procyclical effects in some years for most countries. Our results suggest that the interregional 
smoothing channel is as important as intertemporal smoothing through debt. The latter 
provides an additional cushioning effect of 9% at euro area level.  
Table 2. Smoothing effects of simulated EMU-UI 
 Interregional Intertemporal  Overall 
AT 5.8 18.2 24.0 
BE 3.0 14.5 17.5 
CY 17.7 7.3 25.0 
EE 19.4 0.8 20.2 
FI 2.4 22.5 25.0 
FR 7.7 12.8 20.5 
GE 11.0 5.8 16.8 
GR 12.0 4.8 16.9 
IE 15.7 5.9 21.6 
IT 5.5 11.4 16.9 
LU 7.1 18.0 25.1 
LV 21.6 1.2 22.8 
MT -4.6 24.9 20.3 
NL 8.3 13.9 22.2 
PT 13.4 5.8 19.2 
SI 5.6 13.5 19.1 
SK 9.6 5.6 15.2 
SP 17.8 5.3 23.0 
EA18 9.9 9.3 19.2 
Notes: Stabilisation coefficients for interregional and intertemporal smoothing weighted by shock size over the period 2000-13. 
Smoothing coefficients at EA-18 level calculated as population-weighted average of member state's smoothing coefficients. The 
unweighted smoothing coefficients at EA-18 level are 10.0 for interregional smoothing and 10.7 for intertemporal smoothing.  
Source: Dolls et al. (2018). 
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Budgetary and redistributive effects  
The simulated EMU-UI scheme could be implemented with a relatively small annual budget. 
Over the period 2000-13, average benefits would have amounted to roughly €47 billion per 
year. If it were calibrated to be revenue-neutral (at euro area level) over the period 2000-13, 
the uniform contribution rate would have amounted to 1.56% on employment income. The 
scheme is not designed to cause permanent redistribution across countries because only short-
term (rather than structural) unemployment is insured. Nevertheless, our simulations reveal 
that a small number of member states would have been net contributors (Austria, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands) or net recipients (Spain) in each year of our simulation period. Figure 1 shows that 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands would have been the largest net contributors with 
average yearly net contributions of 0.19-0.39% of GDP. Latvia and Spain are the largest net 
recipients (average yearly net benefits of 0.36 and 0.54% of GDP).  
Figure 1. Average yearly net contributions, 2000-13 
 
Note: Net contribution = Social insurance contributions - benefits. Contribution rate is uniform across member states. Scheme 
is revenue-neutral over the simulation period.   
Source: Dolls et al. (2018). 
Contingent EMU-UI scheme 
The rationale for a contingent EMU-UI scheme is that member states can deal with normal 
business cycle fluctuations, whereas large shocks may jeopardise social cohesion and put public 
finances under excessive strain. Contingent benefits from the EMU-UI that only kick-in during 
severe recessions could also alleviate the risk of permanent and unidirectional transfers. We 
simulate an EMU-UI scheme with contingent benefits that is activated if the unemployment 
rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point higher than the unemployment rate in i) year t-1, ii) 
years t-1 or t-2, iii) years t-1 or t-2 or t-3. Longer look-back periods ensure that EMU-UI benefits 
can remain activated in sustained periods of high unemployment. In all other dimensions, such 
-1.5
-1.25
-1
-.75
-.5
-.25
0
.25
.5
.75
in
 %
 o
f 
 G
D
P
AT BE CY EE FI FR GE GR IE IT LU LV MT NL PT SI SK SP
Net contributor Net recipient Min / Max
16 | AN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEME FOR THE EURO AREA? 
 
as payout rules and revenue-neutrality at euro area level, the contingent benefit schemes are 
identical to the baseline EMU-UI scheme (scheme 4 in Table 1). 
Figure 2. Cumulative net contributions – Contingent benefits 
 
Note: Baseline and contingent benefits. Contingent scheme i): Benefits are paid if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 
percentage point higher than in t-1 (one-year look-back period). Contingent scheme ii): 2-year look-back period. Contingent 
scheme iii): 3-year look-back period.   
Source: Dolls et al. (2018). 
We find that with a three-year look-back period, contingent benefits would have been triggered 
in all member states at least once and no country would have been a permanent net 
contributor or net recipient. With average yearly benefits of €13, 19 and 22 billion at the 
Eurozone-level, the overall budget of the three contingent EMU-UI schemes is significantly 
smaller compared to the non-contingent EMU-UI scheme (€47 billion per year). Figure 2 shows 
the cumulative net contributions to the baseline and to the three contingent EMU-UI schemes 
of selected countries. France, a net recipient at the end of the simulation period in the baseline, 
becomes a net contributor under contingent benefit schemes i) and ii). In the Netherlands, 
accumulated net contributions are reduced by more than 50% by the end of the simulation 
period relative to the baseline. Spain, a net recipient in the baseline throughout the simulation 
period, becomes a net contributor until 2007 and a net recipient in the remaining years. These 
results show that an EMU-UI system with contingent benefits could indeed provide more targeted 
transfers to member states that see their labour market conditions significantly deteriorating. 
Conclusion 
Our paper has analysed the potential added value of an EMU-UI which hinges on its ability to 
provide interregional smoothing. We have shown that, over the period 2000-13, the 
interregional smoothing effects would have been counter-cyclical on average, but with pro-
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cyclical effects in most member states in some years. Moreover, smoothing gains would have 
been unevenly distributed across countries. While the simulated EMU-UI schemes are not 
designed to give rise to permanent transfers, our results reveal that four member states would 
have been either a permanent net contributor or net recipient. Experience rating or contingent 
benefits could limit the degree of cross-country redistribution, but might reduce the desired 
insurance effects.  
One should note that simulations of the fiscally most integrated EMU-UI scheme assume 
revenue-neutrality over the entire time span considered, but not in each period. This raises the 
issue of whether the EMU-UI would be allowed to issue debt. In our calculations, the EMU-UI 
would have produced a surplus in its early phase, so that reserves would have been available to 
finance higher benefits in the crisis. While reserves would provide a buffer in the next recession, 
there is a concern that political pressures would prevent the accumulation of surpluses and, 
instead, let the EMU-UI incur more and more debt until it needs to be ‘bailed out’ by the 
member states. Clearly, even though a balanced budget in each period would limit the ability 
of the system to act as a fiscal stabiliser, an effective debt limitation would be needed.  
Finally, we should emphasise that our analysis has a number of limitations which should be 
taken into account in interpretation of the results. Most importantly, it is not the objective of 
our paper to establish whether or not the introduction of an EMU-UI scheme is desirable in 
terms of overall welfare. Our analysis is descriptive and simply focuses on the financial flows 
implied by an EMU-UI and the ability of these flows to act as an automatic stabiliser. In addition, 
we take economic behaviour as given. Adding behavioural and welfare effects to the analysis 
would be a promising subject for future research. 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 13 November 2017 
Presentation by Mathias Dolls, discussion led by Ricardo Reis  
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Roel Beetsma University of Amsterdam 
Mathias Dolls ifo Institute 
Daniel Gros Centre for European Policy Studies 
Pietro Reichlin LUISS Guido Carli University 
Ricardo Reis LSE 
Jörg Rocholl ESMT Berlin 
Nicolas Véron Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
Ricardo Reis made three points. First, unemployment insurance needs to be viewed in 
connection with other social policies, in particular poverty prevention, disability insurance, 
early retirement, and basic income policies. A harmonisation of unemployment insurance 
would be difficult without harmonising other policies as well, which in turn would affect the 
stabilisation properties of the system. However, harmonising these policies may not be where 
Europe stands in terms of political union and voter preferences. 
Second, the simulation shows that the no permanent transfer condition is not satisfied over the 
simulation period. As basic unemployment levels differ between countries and over time, and 
unemployment tends to be very persistent, the no transfer requirement may only be satisfied 
over very long time periods. If this is politically not tenable, and the system would be required 
to zero out every five or ten years, the stabilisation benefit would be much lower. Third, an 
insurance solely against very bad outcomes is equally important and maybe more effective.  
Following up, Jeromin Zettelmeyer suggested simulating the re-insurance version of a scheme 
that could consider an ‘experience rating’ (see discussion notes in annex to Chapter 1), and 
evaluate the stabilisation outcome and the resulting transfer properties. He also pointed out 
that constraining transfers to zero out every few years – basically within a business cycle – does 
not make much sense as it could come to resemble self-insurance. He expressed hope that 
euro area member would be sufficiently patient to permit a longer period, such as a generation, 
to allow net payments to even out. Furthermore, he pointed out that the survey results 
presented in fact suggest that on an unconditional basis, a majority may exist for the common 
unemployment scheme. 
Roel Beetsma wondered whether only uncorrelated shocks should be considered. In the 
simulation, it may be the case that even countries hit by a shock remain net contributors if the 
euro area is hit by a correlated (or symmetric) shock. Mathias Dolls responded that 
interregional smoothing is indeed not countercyclical in all countries, as countries suffering 
smaller shocks may still remain a net contributor. 
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Roel Beetsma also pointed out that it may be useful to take into account different equilibrium 
unemployment rates. Mathias Dolls responded that the idea was to simulate a basic scheme 
without considering equilibrium unemployment rates, or other feedback effects. 
Pietro Reichlin agreed to the benefits of the proposal and pointed out that it may raise levels 
of public approval for the EU if it shows it can save not only banks, but also individuals. He also 
saw the benefit of possibly facilitating the convergence of institutions. However, he wondered 
about the simulation result for Italy, in which the country turns out to be a net contributor, 
which would worsen its already difficult position. He also pointed out that the individuals who 
suffered most in Italy are most likely the most difficult to insure, such as the self-employed or 
elderly. Hence, he thought it may be best to focus efforts on a system that offers transfers only 
in case of large shocks and leaves it up to the recipient country how to spend the funds. 
Daniel Gros recalled that the value added of a system of large gross payments going one 
direction one year, and in the other direction another year, is questionable. Only if the marginal 
benefit is convex and not linear, could such a system make sense. 
Jochen Andritzky commented that if the starting point were different, in other words if national 
schemes had sufficient reserves to avoid pro-cyclical increases in contributions in a downturn, 
then the stabilisation benefits would turn out lower. He wondered whether a European labour 
contract with a European unemployment insurance, which could co-exist in parallel to national 
labour contracts and labour market institutions, is a way to go instead. However, unity of liability 
and control may be tricky to maintain as other economic policies also affect unemployment.  
Ricardo Reis reiterated that any harmonisation may be difficult to achieve. He wondered 
whether other, simpler schemes for shock absorption may be preferable, such as a European 
level treasury. However, the individual relation of unemployment insurance distinguishes it 
from country-level shock absorption schemes.  
Jochen Andritzky mentioned other ways to absorb shocks, such as allowing countries (or 
national unemployment systems) to incur larger deficits and facilitate their financing, if needed, 
through ESM assistance. Such a system could be compared to the US, where states have to 
repay federal contributions. Ricardo Reis pointed out that a difference to the US is when and 
how these contributions are to be repaid. Daniel Gros responded that there is a great difference 
between a system of transfers and an ESM loan. Jeromin Zettelmeyer agreed that self-
insurance through incurring debt is not risk sharing, unless repayment is made state contingent. 
However, hitting the sweet spot between intercountry risk sharing and permanent transfer is 
tricky. Making repayments to the ESM state contingent could blur the lines with crisis lending, 
and thus a separate institution would be needed. Jochen Andritzky agreed that at least a facility 
other than macroeconomic adjustment programmes would be required.  
Mathias Dolls emphasised that interregional smoothing is the key element of the proposal, not 
the intertemporal aspect. In this way, interregional smoothing could turn out to be pro-cyclical. 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer said that this could be mitigated by a borrowing facility, although this 
would always be politically contentious. 
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3 European fiscal rules and governance: Quo vadis? 
 
Roel Beetsma 
University of Amsterdam and Member of the European Fiscal Board 
Eloïse Stéclebout-Orseau 
Secretariat of the European Fiscal Board 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the European Union’s construct to enforce fiscal discipline 
among the Member States, has undergone a number of important changes since its inception 
more than 20 years ago. In the triangular trade-off between simplicity, adaptability and 
predictability (see Figure 1), the SGP started as relatively simple, but relatively weak in terms 
of adaptability and predictability. The reform in 2005 introduced the country-specific medium-
term budgetary objectives (MTOs) and it allowed for the costs of certain structural reforms, 
such as a transition from pay-as-you-go to funded pensions, to be taken into account in the 
trajectory to the MTO. In 2011, further amendments introduced elements to refine the 
requirements and the assessment of compliance, including a norm for expenditure growth, a 
modulation of fiscal effort depending on the cyclical position and a specific procedure in case 
of deviation under the preventive arm.  
Figure 1. Trade-off in the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
 
Source: Buti (2018). 
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More recently, in 2015 the European Commission described how it would adjust fiscal 
requirements based on both the cyclical position and debt sustainability conditions, and also 
taking into account the cost of certain structural reforms and public investment expenditure. 
Finally, for the 2018 cycle, the Commission may decide to lower the requirements for some 
countries if it finds that their economic situation warrants it. Hence, the consecutive changes 
have made the Pact ‘smarter’, i.e. more adaptable, but less predictable overall. In any case, the 
complexity of the Pact has increased enormously along the way. The latest version of the 
European Commission’s (2018) Vade mecum adds up to 220 pages. 
This contribution briefly reviews the weaknesses in the implementation of the SGP before 
putting forward proposals to reinforce the fiscal framework. It considers first incremental fixes, 
then improvements that would require more fundamental changes. Finally, it discusses the role 
of financial markets in enforcing fiscal discipline. 
Failings of Europe’s fiscal policy 
It is well known that the SGP has not prevented countries from running excessive deficits. 
Notably, shortly after the eruption of the global economic and financial crisis, most member 
states were placed in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), while public debts soared, partly 
as a result of interventions in the financial sector, but mostly because of the weak cycle. As a 
result, to maintain access to the capital markets at reasonable conditions, governments were 
forced to implement fiscal contractions in the midst of a very weak economic situation. In fact, 
fiscal efforts in 2012 were close to 1.5% of GDP, substantially exceeding the requirements of 
the SGP – see Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Aggregate euro area fiscal effort versus requirements and output gaps 
 
Note: Output gap is in percent of potential GDP.  
Source: Buti (2018).  
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As has often been pointed out, the main failing of European fiscal policy is its pro-cyclicality. 
See Figure 3, which plots the change of the structural primary balance against the output gap 
in percent of potential GDP. Half of the time since 2000, the fiscal stance has been pro-cyclical, 
with the structural primary balance tending to deteriorate when the output gap is positive and 
to improve when the output gap is negative. When times are good, governments tend to relax 
their fiscal efforts, forcing them to tighten their efforts when circumstances are no longer 
benign, which is precisely when contractions hurt their populations hardest. The pattern of 
relaxation of fiscal efforts is again visible in a number of countries now that their economies 
have the wind in their sails. The SGP has not been able to prevent this pattern, despite the 
increasing importance attached over time to its preventive arm. 
Figure 3. Change in structural primary balance (vertical axis) vs. output gap (horizontal axis) 
 
Note: Change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance until 2010, change in the structural primary balance thereafter. 
Incremental improvements in the SGP 
The European Fiscal Board (2017) in its first Annual Report has come up with a number of 
suggestions to improve the enforcement of the SGP and to strengthen the incentives it offers 
to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies. These suggestions were of an “incremental nature”, i.e. 
aimed at improving the SGP within the confines of current Treaty, and concern both the 
preventive and the corrective arms of the SGP. 
A first set of suggestions aims at making the SGP more symmetric. Currently, the preventive 
arm of the SGP does not require compensating for past deviations from fiscal targets. Hence, 
member states may have an incentive to target a “non-significant” deviation from the required 
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fiscal effort, that is, a deviation of less than 0.25% every year.1 Obviously, over time, these 
deviations would add up to a substantial deviation from the envisaged adjustment path – see 
Figure 4. A way to address this perverse incentive is to introduce a “compensation account” in 
which past deviations are accumulated. As with the compensation account in the Swiss debt 
brake or the “control account” in the German debt brake, governments would be required to 
make up for past failures to exert enough effort. Reductions in the account would only apply 
during economic upturns. Asymmetry of the rules is also inherent in the corrective arm. 
Currently, a worsening of economic conditions may lead to more lenient fiscal targets and/or 
an extension of the deadline to correct an excessive deficit, whereas the rules in future could 
also tighten the fiscal targets when economic conditions exhibit an unexpected improvement. 
Figure 4. Small tolerated deviations from targets are systematically exploited 
 
 
Note: SB = structural balance, EB = expenditure benchmark. 
The EFB also makes some proposals to improve the enforcement of the SGP. The Commission 
and the Council have the discretion to cancel fines for no effective action, which they exploited 
in the cases of Portugal and Spain in 2016. The incentives to enforce the Pact, in particular 
when financial sanctions are foreseen, are often weak. They can be weak on the side of the 
Commission, which may fear that popular support for the European Union will be further 
undermined or that its reputation will be undermined if its recommendations for further steps 
in the EDP are blocked by ECOFIN. Also, it is easy for governments, at least in some countries, 
to blame ‘Brussels’ for unpopular recommendations and decisions. The Ministers of Finance, in 
turn, may be reluctant to exert peer pressure and spoil relations with their colleagues. In 
addition, they may fear receiving a fine themselves, if their country were to end up in a similar 
situation at a later date. Finally, there may be domestic public opinion considerations.  
The possibility exists to suspend part or all of the commitments or payments related to the 
European Structural and Investment (ESI) funds following lack of effective action. This requires 
                                                     
1 Or of less than 0.5% over two years. 
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the Commission to engage in a structured dialogue with the European Parliament. Once the 
EDP is held in abeyance or abrogated, the suspension of the funds is lifted and they are re-
budgeted. A complication is that conditionality applied to ESI funds may be pro-cyclical and that 
countries would make unequal use of these funds and, hence, the effectiveness of this 
sanctioning instrument would operate unevenly across different countries. A possibility would 
be to extend conditionality beyond the ESI funds. Moreover, conditionality could be made more 
automatic. With the preparation of a new multiannual financial framework, member states 
could establish the amount of funds to be withheld in the case of non-compliance. Once non-
compliance with EU fiscal rules is established, funds would be suspended as long as non-
compliance persists. This would have the advantage of being a credible sanctioning mechanism 
for all member states. To minimise collateral damage, it could be aimed at non-productive 
expenditures, such as expenditures on the welfare state. 
Fundamental improvements to Europe’s fiscal framework 
The proposed adjustments to the SGP discussed in the previous section were relatively 
incremental. However, voices pleading a radical overhaul of Europe’s fiscal framework are 
becoming louder. A thorough overhaul might actually necessitate a re-opening of the Treaty. 
Any redesign of the framework faces a trade-off between simplicity and flexibility. Simple rules 
do not account for economic circumstances and are inflexible, potentially forcing governments 
into following suboptimal policies. By contrast, flexible rules require complex provisions to 
account for all possible circumstances, and thus may be difficult to enforce and thereby 
undermine fiscal sustainability. 
The question is how a smart institutional design can alleviate this trade-off. The EFB discusses 
the possibility of a radical simplification of the SGP in the longer term. To limit the 
consequences of diminished flexibility, the EFB proposes introducing escape clauses for 
adverse economic circumstances. Assessing these circumstances would then be left to an 
independent institution and escape clauses would be triggered on the basis of a 
recommendation from this institution. The recommendation could include parameters for the 
escape, such as the amount by which the fiscal target can be reduced and how much time the 
country is given to correct the deviation. The proposal sees as crucial that the institution is able 
to take its decisions in a truly independent way, which means that is can conduct its own 
economic analyses and that it has sufficient resources to do this. It imposes requirements on 
the appointment process and the background of its Board Members – see the OECD’s Principles 
for Independent Fiscal Institutions (Von Trapp et al., 2016). 
What might such a radically simplified SGP look like? It could have a single long-run target such 
as a debt anchor of, say, 60% of GDP, or lower. The IMF, among others, has argued in favour of 
the debt ratio as a single objective. Eventually, it is more debt than deficits that matter for the 
space accessible to a government and for conditions in the capital markets.2 One could discuss 
whether it is gross or net debt that should be targeted. Net debt would require establishing the 
                                                     
2 Still, the deficit could provide independent information on the prospects for a government’s finances, as deficits 
tend to be persistent and high deficits are difficult to correct. 
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government’s assets in a comparable way, while gross financial liabilities are closely linked to 
refinancing needs. Hence, gross debt seems to be the more relevant concept to target in 
practice. A long-run target would then be supported by an intermediate target that is 
consistent with the long-run target. This could take the form of a deficit norm formulated in 
nominal or structural terms. The former may provide insufficient incentive for conducting the 
necessary fiscal effort, although an intermediate target that is sufficiently distant could be 
translated into a planned path of structural effort. This brings us to the operational instrument, 
the most obvious candidates being the change in the structural balance and the growth of 
(primary) public expenditure (net of discretionary revenue measures). In the case of the former, 
the intermediate objective could be some form of MTO. Similarly, in the case of net expenditure 
growth, the gap between the current budget balance and the intermediate objective could 
define the required adjustment in net expenditure growth. It is important, though, to define a 
unique operational target to avoid arbitrage between the targets.  
The proposal to radically simplify the SGP assigns a large role to an independent fiscal 
institution (IFI). A legitimate question is whether the recommendation to trigger the escape 
clause and its specific design could come from national IFIs. While national IFIs play an 
important role in preparing and assessing forecasts and monitoring fiscal rules, we are sceptical 
that they could be entrusted with this task, which requires consistency of their decisions across 
countries: conditions for allowing an escape should be equally tight across the euro area. Such 
consistency would not be easy to guarantee, even if the fiscal framework is centrally designed 
and identical across member states. In addition, being closer to national governments, it may 
be harder to shelter IFIs from government influence. 
Finally, fiscal discipline might be more effectively enforced if the euro area were equipped with 
a central fiscal capacity (CFC) mandated to stabilise the economy in case of major shocks. There 
would be several potential advantages to this: national fiscal policies could focus on ensuring 
sustainability; fiscal support could be provided directly where it is needed, relying on multiplier 
effects rather than on spill over effects; and, if access to the CFC were conditional on adhering 
to the SGP, this would provide a strong incentive for countries to comply. Of course, designing 
a CFC raises numerous questions, including how to finance it, when and how to trigger 
payments, and, crucially, how to avoid permanent transfers and moral hazard (e.g. see the 
attempt by Carnot et al., 2017). A variety of proposals have been made recently that fulfil these 
requirements to different extents. The European Fiscal Board discusses the possibility of an 
unemployment reinsurance fund and of an investment protection capacity. While the idea of 
an unemployment reinsurance fund has received most attention in the literature (e.g., see 
Beblavý et al., 2015, Dolls et al., 2015, and Arnold et al., 2018),3 overall the EFB believes the 
investment protection capacity to be the more promising avenue, as it can build on existing 
experience and leveraging resources from the private sector. Moreover, it would positively 
affect both demand and long-run growth potential. Finally, investment is likely the expenditure 
category hit hardest during a crisis. 
                                                     
3 Beetsma et al. (2018) propose a CFC scheme for the Eurozone in which transfers are linked to shocks in world 
trade – they claim that such a scheme minimises the danger of moral hazard. 
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The role of market discipline 
Financial markets are known to react in a very abrupt way. While over a very long period they 
kept yield differences on eurozone public debt to a minimum, there was a sudden outburst of 
panic in April and May 2010, resulting in rapidly widening gaps between periphery and core 
yields. The crisis-management framework that was put in place did little to sooth the markets 
and yield differences may even have reached levels exceeding those that would reflect 
differences in default risk. Only the ECB managed to calm markets down. Unfortunately, the 
ECB medicine, in particular its quantitative easing program, may have dangerous side effects in 
the form of asset market bubbles and misleading market signals resulting in capital being 
channelled to investments of which the risks are under-priced. 
For financial markets to exert a disciplining effect on governments requires two parts of the 
chain to work: (i) differences in risk should be priced in properly, and (ii) governments should 
respond to (significant) yield rises with measures that improve public finances. Regarding the 
former, there are, in theory at least, several possibilities to improve the pricing of public debt. 
One is to impose charges on an unduly high concentration of public debt from a single issuer 
on the balance sheets of commercial banks. Another is to abolish the zero risk-weighting of 
sovereign debt for the capital requirements of commercial banks. The design of the 
introduction of such measures is crucial. For example, concentration charges would have to be 
phased in gradually, so that banks have enough time to off-load excess amounts of debt of their 
own sovereign and to avoid disruptions in the markets for the financing of both sovereigns and 
banks. Similarly, risk-weighting of sovereign debt needs to be increased gradually. Of course, 
there is also the problem of establishing the appropriate numerical values for concentration 
charges and risk-weighting. However, the most important obstacle is resistance from the 
political side. Some countries use their banking sector as an easy and cheap way to finance their 
deficits (e.g. Ongena et al., 2016). These governments obviously cannot be expected to be 
enthusiastic about such proposals. 
Concluding remarks 
The Economic and Monetary Union is still far from complete. The European Commission in its 
“December package” of 2017 sets out a roadmap for deepening it, which comprises the 
completion of the capital markets union, the banking union and proposals for structural reform 
support, a convergence facility for non-euro member states and a stabilisation function to be 
embedded in the new EU multiannual financial framework. The package also contains 
proposals to improve democratic accountability and effective governance. It is unclear as yet 
which elements of the package may be brought into existence within the foreseen time span, 
but there is clearly substantial uncertainty about the outcomes, because member states have 
widely diverging views on the desirability of deepening EMU.  
The simplification of the SGP has been postponed until 2020 or even later. This is unfortunate, 
because there is a widely-shared perception that its functioning needs to be improved, while a 
revision of the Pact could be part of a broader package of proposals with gains from trade-offs 
for the different sides of the debate. In this contribution, we offered some proposals to improve 
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the functioning of the Pact, as well as to simplify it. We also discussed the complementarity 
between the Pact and a well-designed CFC, and we closed with a discussion of the options for 
enhancing the role of market discipline in enforcing fiscal discipline. 
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Jeromin Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
Lars P. Feld noted that – despite all their imperfections – the fiscal rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) have an impact. A key challenge lies in the pro-cyclicality of the rules. 
Cyclically-adjusted deficits are difficult to determine and often distorted, particularly when 
calculated in real time. Furthermore, member states are sovereign in their conduct of fiscal 
policy and the capacity of the higher (European) level to constrain member states is limited. He 
agreed that the current rules are too complex.  
He argued for focusing on the debt-to-GDP ratio and aiming to reduce public debt ratios so as 
to make the euro area more resilient to shocks. This could be achieved by an expenditure rule, 
possibly stripping out cyclical components of unemployment compensation. In addition, he 
considered compensation accounts a good way of correcting over-optimistic or over-
pessimistic assessments. Unfortunately, most member states have not introduced 
compensation accounts following the Fiscal Compact. However, corrections from 
compensation accounts should not take place pro-cyclically. In his view, linking the SGP and the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) is problematic, as it offers the European 
Commission an additional argument to put or reduce pressure on selected countries. Roel 
Beetsma agreed to focusing on the debt ratio and recalled that the debt ratio is influenced by 
stock-flow operations, among other factors. He agreed with the comments on the usefulness 
of well-designed compensation accounts. He also mentioned that fiscal coordination does not 
come about by itself and needs to be organised. 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer also favoured an expenditure rule to avoid the issue of cyclical 
adjustment. An expenditure path could be set based on expected potential output growth and 
inflation, say at a five-year horizon, which is not nearly as hard or volatile as a yearly cyclical 
adjustment in real time. However, there is a problem when the expenditure path is set for the 
first time and it may require adjustments over time. Roel Beetsma pointed out that relative 
prices between different categories of public spending may change, which can pose a challenge 
with regard to the nominal expenditure path, as the experience of the Netherlands has shown. 
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Jochen Andritzky wondered about enforcement, considering sanctioning unlikely to be 
powerful enough. This is why the GCEE proposed linking compliance with fiscal rules to the 
framework for sovereign debt restructuring: countries that fail to comply with fiscal rules would 
ask their bondholders to extend maturities in case of a crisis requiring ESM assistance (see 
Andritzky et al., 2016). Alternatively, rule compliance could be linked to access to ESM 
precautionary facilities. Certainly, these are extremely blunt ways of fostering market discipline. 
Roel Beetsma found these ideas well worth discussing, but warned about doubtful time 
consistency. 
In this context, Jeromin Zettelmeyer referred to the recently published Franco-German reform 
proposal (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018). Milling over the credibility of market discipline, the 
report calls for making restructuring less “horrible” by presenting a package that also includes 
more risk sharing. In the report, a version of Accountability Bonds (Fuest and Heinemann, 2017) 
is proposed where excess deficits are funded through junior bonds including an automatic 
maturity extension clause. This contractual feature makes restructuring of junior bonds more 
credible as no policy decision is required. Nicolas Véron added that the report’s authors were 
not in favour of automatic re-profiling of the debt stock at large as this is too disruptive and 
henceforth not credible. Roel Beetsma agreed, but wondered whether there is a market for 
junior bonds. Nicolas Véron responded that a higher spread would be intended, and only low 
volumes may need to be issued. Jochen Andritzky clarified that the GCEE proposal is not for a 
fully automatic mechanism either, and only bases the initial maturity extension at the first stage 
on fairly simple criteria, whereas deeper debt restructuring including haircuts would be based 
on DSA not dissimilar to the IMF’s framework. 
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4 Sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area? 
Jochen Andritzky, Désirée I. Christofzik and Lars P. Feld 
German Council of Economic Experts1 
In the euro area, responsibility for fiscal policy rests with national governments. At the current 
juncture, completing political union or installing a strong euro area capacity with the power to 
tax and spend do not appear feasible. Therefore, national responsibility for fiscal policy will 
continue to be complemented by common fiscal rules, such as those discussed in Chapter 3, to 
help member states to arrive at sustainable public finances. In addition, market discipline 
provides incentives to keep public indebtedness low in order to avoid getting into trouble in 
the first place.  
The debt crisis in European Monetary Union (EMU) has illustrated that market turbulences can 
occur and can cut off member states from market funding. Thus, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) was created to provide an alternative source of financing and to complement 
the global financial safety net. However, the ESM must not undermine the credibility of the no-
bailout clause – an important safeguard against moral hazard in policy-making – or lead to large 
transfers. The ESM’s conditionality framework, including its safeguards against lending to 
insolvent countries, aims at preventing this.  
For the ESM to help member states where public debt may be unsustainable on one hand, and 
prevent moral hazard at the same time on the other hand, the ESM needs an instrument to 
restore solvency. Currently, the euro area lacks a sufficiently credible framework for such 
situations. This sets the euro area apart from the IMF which – after introducing the systemic 
exemption clause in face of the euro area crisis – strengthened its lending framework in 2015 
(IMF, 2015).   
While creditor bail-in has become an accepted principle for banking crises as part of the euro 
area Banking Union project, no similarly comprehensive framework is available for sovereign 
debt crises. All that exist are provisions in the ESM Treaty for sustainable debt and the 
introduction of Collective Action Clauses (CAC) in newly issued bonds since 2013. However, an 
operational framework that explicitly sets out when and how debt restructuring is activated, 
does not exist. Such a framework could also improve crisis prevention by strengthening market 
discipline ex ante. 
Addressing liquidity and solvency issues in two stages 
Such an instrument could consist of a market-based mechanism that is activated as part of the 
ESM’s macroeconomic adjustment programmes when the beneficiary’s public debt is high. 
Restructuring could take place in two stages. In the first stage, highly indebted member states 
                                                     
1 This contribution is a short version of Andritzky et al. (2018). 
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would initiate a maturity extension at the beginning of an ESM programme to reduce financing 
needs. In other words, disbursements of any funds become conditional on creditors and 
debtors reaching an agreement on a standstill for the duration of the programme. Only if 
needed, a deeper debt restructuring could address solvency concerns in a second stage during 
the course of the programme. The two-stage approach resolves the difficulty of having to 
distinguish between a pure liquidity crisis and a solvency problem at the onset of a crisis when 
long-term economic potential and debt sustainability are most uncertain. 
Maturity extensions when debt is high bear several benefits. First, they reduce subordination 
given the preferred creditor status of official lenders and maintain creditors’ exposure, which 
can later become subject to deeper debt restructuring. Second, they are considered to be less 
disruptive than outright debt reductions, therefore reducing the risk of contagion (IMF, 2014b). 
This provides time for creditors to create buffers before an eventual debt reduction is 
implemented. Third, maturity extensions reduce the funding need for rollovers which draw 
heavily on the ESM’s limited resources. In the recent crises of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, 
maturing long-term debt securities accounted for respectively 62 %, 21 %, and 64 % of the total 
funding needs (Figure 1). Using these savings in lending capacity, the ESM could finance 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes with longer durations, leaving more time for reforms.  
Figure 1. 
 
The completion of a first-stage restructuring does not preclude deeper debt restructuring, such 
as including coupon or face-value reductions, if necessary, to restore a member state’s 
solvency. This second-stage operation should ensure durable market access after the end of 
the programme and full repayment of the ESM to prevent moral hazard at the cost of the ESM’s 
creditors, the taxpayers of the euro area. Conducting deeper debt restructuring at a later stage 
offers more time for reforms to bear fruit and for creditors to build buffers. It allows for a 
deeper analysis by the ESM and more comprehensive negotiations to find a tailor-made 
solution to the solvency problem. 
Financing needs during the crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal1
1 – Sum of general government deficit and amortization of long-term debt securities. 2 – Greece: including PE borrowing need.
a – May - December. b – January - June. c – Including December 2010. d – June - December.
Source: Andritzky et al. (2018)
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Implementing the mechanism requires a legal foundation to rule out that holdouts – a minority 
of bondholders trying to escape the restructuring – can become a serious threat to the debt 
operation. First, new bonds should contain single limb voting procedures as proposed by the 
IMF (2014a). Such collective action clauses – Creditor Participation Clauses (CPC) – could be 
linked to the restructuring framework outlined above which could be integrated in ESM 
regulations. Second, an amendment to the ESM Treaty could introduce an immunity clause as 
proposed by Buchheit et al. (2013) or Fuest et al. (2014). Such a provision would protect the 
assets of a member state from attachment during and after an ESM programme as long as it 
has loans drawn from the ESM.  
Our proposal rests on the premise that a maturity extension causes minimal disruptions to 
financial intermediation. Therefore, it is important that bonds with CPCs retain their function 
as collateral. On the one hand, banks need to diversify their sovereign debt holdings which 
could be achieved by penalising instead of incentivising large and non-diversified sovereign 
debt holdings by banks and other financial institutions. On the other hand, unwarranted 
obstacles to market-based maturity extensions need to be removed. For instance, if 
bondholders agree to a maturity extension to the benefit of resolving a crisis, there is no reason 
why the ECB should not accept these assets as collateral or why rating agencies would classify 
them the same way as a claim that has become worthless.  
Choice of triggers 
Our proposal contains different approaches to distinguish between first-stage versus second-
stage debt restructuring (Figure 2). As it is the case today, a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) 
lays the basis for decisions by the ESM to require debt restructuring. 
Figure 2. Timeline of a two-stage decision system for ESM programmes 
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Program request
ESM Program with strict conditionality
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>2-3 violations of fiscal rules in last 5 years
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1 – Newly issued debt including Creditor Participation Clauses.
Source: Andritzky et al. (2018)
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For the first-stage decision, we propose that maturity extension is triggered if debt 
qualifying under this mechanism exceeds a particular debt ratio in the range of 60 % to 90 % 
of GDP, or its refinancing volume exceeds a particular level in the range of 15 % to 20 % of 
GDP during the ESM programme. Note that the framework does not apply to legacy debt 
as only debt issued under the new framework is taken into consideration. Indicators such 
as the debt ratio and gross financing need are accepted anchors in evaluating debt 
sustainability (IMF, 2011; IMF, 2013). Providing clear thresholds of hard-to-manipulate 
criteria strengthens the ex ante disciplining effect and reduces the discretion of policy-
makers. Yet, our proposal stops short of an automatic maturity extension, as proposed by 
Weber et al. (2011), as in our view the drawback of contractual rigidities outweighs the gain 
in credibility of the no-bailout principle. 
As an innovative, alternative criterion we propose a compliance with fiscal rules that could help 
to strengthen their ex ante disciplining effect on fiscal policy. Compliance with these rules can 
be seen as relevant factor for assessing debt sustainability because it can be interpreted as 
proxy for the economic and political capacity to deliver fiscal adjustment. 
For the second-stage decision, the need for deeper debt restructuring is judged on the basis of 
the ESM’s revised DSA. As opposed to a statutory approach where an external body imposes 
restructuring, the terms of the restructuring would be agreed between the debtor country, 
bondholders, and the ESM. Deeper debt restructuring should aim at achieving debt 
sustainability in the long run to ensure durable re-entry to bond markets while minimising 
disruptions to the ongoing recovery. The transaction would need to be completed before the 
end of the ESM programme. 
A credible and sustainable path towards the new regime 
Public debt in many member states is still high, making any change to the institutional setting 
of sovereign debt markets tricky. To avoid adverse market reactions, we propose to phase-in 
the mechanism over time by issuing bonds with CPCs as current debt falls due or deficits require 
additional financing. The framework would only apply to this portion of debt. Since such a 
phase-in progresses continuously, there is no cliff-edge problem and the transition path is fully 
credible. 
To illustrate this, Andritzky et al. (2018) simulate two speeds for the phase-in based on 
calculations by Eidam (2016).2 Data include all government bonds issued by central 
governments available on Bloomberg as of 2016. Assuming that the issuance of new debt 
including CPCs started in 2017, Figure 3 shows the outstanding stock of government bonds 
including the CPC in percent of GDP for two scenarios. In one scenario, all new deficits and all 
bonds falling due are refinanced with new securities containing CPCs. In the second scenario, 
only deficits are financed with bonds containing CPCs.  
Most countries would pass the lower threshold of 60% of GDP within a couple of years if all 
debt is refinanced with CPC-bonds. Depending on projected deficits, the phase-in is much more 
gradual if only new deficits are financed with CPC-bonds. In practice, we believe CPCs may 
                                                     
2 See Andritzky et al. (2018) for further assumptions. 
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become the market standard. In that case, member states may decide to issue a larger share 
of debt with CPCs, in particular if these bonds, like current bonds with CACs, do not trade at a 
discount. 
Figure 3.  
 
The design of the framework as well as its gradual phase-in can prevent another Deauville 
moment for the euro area when implementing the proposal. Previous reforms, most notably 
the Banking Union, have already made the EMU more robust. Similar to the new bail-in policies 
of the Banking Union, a bail-in of sovereign debtholders is already part of the current rulebook, 
with the exception that current inefficiencies and political obstacles may render it difficult to 
implement. However, besides completing the Banking Union, complementary measures are 
necessary as outlined above.  
Conclusion 
This contribution proposes a framework for sovereign debt restructuring as part of the euro 
area’s crisis mechanism. Such a framework would bolster the no-bailout clause by more 
explicitly outlining the euro area’s approach to deal with situations where public debt is not 
sustainable in an orderly way. The difference to today’s setting, in which sovereign debt 
restructuring is already foreseen in both the ESM regulations and as part of IMF lending rules, 
is to lend the approach credibility. Therefore, our proposal aims at removing unnecessary 
uncertainty in crises and reduces the economic costs of sovereign debt restructuring. This 
strengthens market discipline and reduces moral hazard.  
A two-stage approach as proposed herein strikes a balance between a rule-based approach 
that is more credible and a discretion-based approach that is more flexible: As a maturity 
extension – the first stage – can be achieved at relatively limited cost, we suggest easy-to-
evaluate trigger points. Deeper debt restructuring – the second stage – would take place, if at 
all, at a later time based on a more comprehensive set of decision criteria. 
Penetration of debt stock with bonds including Creditor Participation Clauses (CPCs) issued from 20171
1 – Assumes bonds are issued with new clauses starting in 2017 based on maturity profile for bonds as of end-2014, with (i) maturity of
newly issued bonds similar to 2014 and (ii) nominal debt following European Commission (2015) and extrapolated from 2027. 2 – Assumes
that shares of other debt relative to GDP remains constant. 3 – Deficits until 2026 based on European Commission (2015), and converging
towards 0.5% of GDP at a speed of 0.5 percentage points afterwards. Bonds falling due are rolled into similar bonds.with CPCs
Sources: Andritzky et al. (2018) and Eidam (2016)
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We explicitly refer to the IMF (2014b, 2015) new lending framework which is closely related. 
The key difference to the IMF framework is that our proposal explicitly puts maturity extension 
and deeper debt restructuring in sequence. This is a response to the experience that, while 
liquidity problems are obvious once a country requests crisis assistance, the member state’s 
solvency cannot be assessed reliably until much later. Despite this difference, in most cases 
such sequencing remains compatible with the IMF new lending framework. 
In contrast to other proposals that propagate more institutional or contractual rigidities, our 
approach is market-based in the sense that the decision to trigger an orderly restructuring 
within this framework rests with bondholders. Our approach also does not require tranching. 
To allow time to tackle legacy debt while providing for a credible path to adopting this 
framework, we illustrate a potential transition phase, in which the bonds including CPCs 
increase gradually. Once fully phased in, our proposal would massively reduce required 
programme funding, thereby bolstering the firepower of the ESM. Complementing this 
framework with a completed Banking Union, the removal of regulatory privileges for sovereign 
debt, and other amendments to enable restoring member states’ debt sustainability does in 
our view not result in financial instability but would rather strengthen the euro area vis-à-vis 
today’s regime dominated by excessive ambiguity and ad hoc solutions. 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 03 May 2018 
Presentation by Jochen Andritzky, discussion led by Pietro Reichlin and Jeromin Zettelmeyer 
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Arnoud Boot University of Amsterdam 
Sam Langfield European Central Bank 
Pietro Reichlin LUISS Guido Carli University 
Nicolas Véron Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
In his comments, Pietro Reichlin addressed three questions. First, should the mechanism rest 
on pre-established rules or on a case-by-case analysis? Second, is this mechanism a tool for 
minimising cost if and when restructuring becomes inevitable or a tool to reduce moral hazard 
and excessive deficits? Third, should we maintain and improve mechanisms for withstanding a 
temporary loss of confidence without debt restructuring?  
Building on these questions, Pietro Reichlin wondered why there needs to be restructuring in 
cases where moral hazard does not play a role, for instance in a pure liquidity crisis following 
contagion. The existence of a restructuring framework could by itself trigger or deepen a 
confidence crisis. If no insurance against confidence crises exists, the euro area may end up 
with under-pricing and too little investment in sovereign debt. Jochen Andritzky pointed out 
the difficulty of distinguishing liquidity from solvency crises and that the proposal intends to 
minimise disruptions and the economic costs of ESM programmes. For example, the ESM could 
offer longer programmes and more gradual adjustment, and enhance its toolbox with a revised 
preventive facility. He also outlined the transition into the new framework, which would avoid 
instability from legacy debt. Only new bonds would be equipped with Creditor Participation 
Clauses, and policymakers would agree on a path of introduction to phase in the mechanism 
carefully.   
In the view of Pietro Reichlin, the proposal may have unintended consequences. Countries may 
avoid ESM assistance or may also engage in tactics such as using domestic banks to accumulate 
national sovereign debt, as is currently the case in Italy. Also, accounting rules must be taken 
into account and there could be a shortening of maturities when a crisis nears, elevating 
rollover risk. Jochen Andritzky emphasised that the idea of the proposal is to reduce cost and 
disruption compared to ad hoc restructuring. In his view, member states may try to avoid ESM 
assistance for other reasons, such its political cost, rather than through fear of restructuring. 
Accounting rules, collateral frameworks, and rating practices may need to be amended to avoid 
unnecessary disruptions. 
For Jeromin Zettelmeyer, the no-bailout rule – as the key pillar of the euro’s architecture – 
needs to become credible. Otherwise, exit from the euro area cannot be ruled out as an 
ultimate tool for resolving crises.  
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The issue of a suitable trigger for restructuring was a recurring issue in the discussion. Pietro 
Reichlin emphasised that deciding whether a restructuring is the best choice depends on a 
complex set of conditions and contingencies. Pre-established rules, such as the decision criteria 
for a maturity extension, increase the probability of incurring a type II error (i.e., imposing debt 
restructuring on a solvent country). Jeromin Zettelmeyer agreed and contrasted two strategies 
to make the no-bailout rule credible given the challenge of time consistency. On the one hand, 
commitment devices to restructure the debts of insolvent countries could be strengthened. 
However, strong commitment devices like pre-established triggers have unintended 
consequences, such as higher type II error probabilities. Furthermore, the case of Greece had 
shown that even supposedly tough commitment devices could fail. For instance, IMF 
participation failed as a commitment device because the IMF changed its Exceptional Access 
Policy to accommodate Greece’s circumstances. On the other hand, the Franco-German euro 
report (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018) relies less on hard commitment devices and more on 
discretion (akin to the IMF’s new lending framework) while focusing on measures to make 
restructuring less costly. In his view, the second approach was better. With respect to 
Andritzky’s proposal he thought the debt ratio was not an informative enough indicator to 
serve as threshold, while gross financing need (GFN) criteria are better suited. The fiscal rule 
violation is a sound addition in countering moral hazard by governments. Jochen Andritzky 
agreed that the proposal presented uses fairly simple criteria as a commitment device. 
However, deeper debt restructuring would allow for more discretion, similar to the IMF 
framework, whereas simple decision criteria are only applied in deciding maturity extension. 
This – like in the Franco-German report – should cause limited disruptions.  
In response to remarks contrasting the proposed framework to the IMF’s new lending 
framework, Jochen Andritzky recalled that the IMF framework allows for discretion. There may 
be instances in which the proposed framework requires maturity extension while the IMF does 
not, but also situations in which the IMF requires deeper restructuring. The latter may be 
particularly relevant in the presence of high legacy debt. The need to avoid “amortisation 
walls”, i.e. periods of very high GFN, must be taken into account.  
Arnoud Boot expressed concerns about policies that infringe on national sovereignty ex post. 
An ex ante focus might be crucial. In his view, ex-ante pricing of generic features in sovereign 
debt can only have a ‘disciplining’ effect if it relates clearly to a country’s behaviour. A reduction 
in legacy debt is crucial before introducing ex ante rules in good times if they are to impose 
discipline. Generally, a system is required that can withstand defaults. Nicolas Véron agreed 
that as long as a restructuring is systemic for the euro area, its ‘disciplining’ effect will not be 
credible. He wondered whether breaking the sovereign-bank nexus is sufficient to prevent 
systemic effects. Jochen Andritzky took the view that concentration limits for sovereign debt 
holdings for banks and other systemic financial institutions are key to avoiding systemic effects. 
Together with other measures, this would notably lower the cost associated with restructuring. 
Pietro Reichlin disagreed. In his view, restructuring always carries the risk of causing a systemic 
crisis, drawing a parallel to the US where subprime mortgage problems triggered widespread 
crises. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, in contrast, took the view that if no institution had a life-
threatening amount of risky instruments, the Global Financial Crisis would not have broken out. 
Nicolas Véron recalled that contagion in the euro area was magnified by breakup risk. 
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Sam Langfield asked which ESM programme facilities this framework would apply to and how 
the length of the maturity extension would be defined. Jochen Andritzky responded that the 
framework should apply to the implementation of ESM macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes. A maturity extension would apply to all bonds. Despite aggregation clauses, 
convincing bondholders of long maturity bonds may be harder, especially when it is clear that 
there is a liquidity problem only in the near term. 
Contrasting the proposal under discussion with the Bundesbank’s (Monatsbericht July 2016), 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer pointed out that an automatic mechanism can trigger runs unless 
restructuring clauses are written in a way that long-term bond holders are not forced into a 
maturity extension. Jochen Andritzky likened the Bundesbank’s contractual approach to state-
contingent debt to providing some form of self-insurance. Automatic maturity extension would 
be set in stone and could create amortisation walls at the end of an ESM programme. 
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5 A safe asset for the euro area?  
Evaluating alternative proposals 
Álvaro Leandro 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer 
Peterson Institute for International Economics1  
Financial systems require ‘safe’ assets to operate. In the United States, this role is performed 
by Treasury bonds. The euro area, however, lacks a common safe asset and banks tend to rely 
on bonds issued by their own countries. This became a problem during the 2010-2012 euro 
crisis, as increases in sovereign borrowing costs raised the funding costs of domestic banks, 
which curtailed lending, exacerbating the recession and hence sovereign stress. Even in non-
crisis times, the lack of a common safe asset contributes to financial fragmentation in the euro 
area, as differences in sovereign risk across countries lead to differences in funding and lending 
conditions across member states, even though they share a common monetary policy.  
Bond holdings by euro area banks continue to be heavily biased towards domestic sovereigns, 
despite the economic recovery and the creation of a common banking supervision. This has led 
to a resurgence of interest in ideas to create a common euro area safe asset (Brunnermeier et 
al. 2017, European Commission 2017, Buti et al. 2018, Leandro and Zettelmeyer 2018 a,b). The 
leading proposal is to create ‘sovereign bond backed securities’ (SBBS) issued by intermediaries 
that would purchase a diversified pool of euro area sovereign bonds. SBBS would consist of a 
senior tranche – sometimes called ‘European Senior Bonds’, or ‘ESBies’ – and one or several 
subordinated tranches that would absorb any first loss. By picking the right subordination level 
– that is, by making the subordinated tranches ‘thick enough’ – ESBies can, in principle, be 
rendered low-risk. Based on a default simulation model, Brunnermeier et al. (2017) estimate 
that a subordination level of about 30% would be required (that is, the senior tranche would 
consist of 70%) to reach the expected loss rate of a German bund.  
Unlike earlier proposals to create a common ‘Eurobond’, ESBies would not require any 
guarantees or additional revenue commitments on the side of member states. Furthermore, 
the technical feasibility of the SBBS proposal has recently been evaluated by a task force of the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB 2018), and the European Commission has issued a 
regulation proposal to enable the development of an SBBS market (European Commission 
2018).  At the same time, the SBBS approach has been heavily criticised from many sides. The 
critics have focused mainly on three arguments.2 First, in a crisis in which sovereign risks in the 
                                                     
1 The authors are grateful to Jochen Andritzky, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Sam Langfield and participants of the 
‘Future Europe’ forum for useful comments and suggestions. 
2 See Academic Advisory Council to the German Ministry of Finance (2017), Minenna (2017), Standard and Poor’s 
(2017), Greive et al (2018), De Grauwe and Ji (2018), Giugliano (2018), Münchau (2018) and Claeys (2018). For 
less critical perspectives, see JPMorgan (2017) and Goldman Sachs (2018). 
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euro area become highly correlated and several countries might default, the supposedly ‘safe’ 
senior tranche might end up being much less safe than its proponents claim. Second, SBBS 
envisage the simultaneous issuance of senior and junior tranches, but would anyone want to 
buy the junior tranches, particularly in a crisis? Third, ESBies might upset the functioning of 
national bond markets, raising sovereign borrowing costs. Given these criticisms, ESBies may 
continue to face an uphill battle. 
Are the criticisms justified? Are there better alternatives to ESBies? To answer these questions, 
we compare SBBS with five alternative ideas to create euro area safe assets. Like SBBS, all avoid 
joint and several guarantees, and all rely to some extent on diversification, while differing in 
other key respects. 
1. Bonds issued by a capitalised intermediary (‘capitalisation approach’). The safe asset 
could consist of a single-tranche bond issued by a public intermediary backed by a 
diversified pool of euro area sovereign bonds. Rather than through tranching, it would 
be made ‘safe’ by a sufficiently thick capital cushion. The required size of the cushion 
would depend on how the capital is invested: if invested in the same portfolio that backs 
debt issuance, it would be exactly the same as that of the junior tranches in the SBBS 
proposal – namely, about 30% of total assets. If it is kept in cash, capitalisation could be 
a little lighter, in the order of 25%. The need to provide this (public) capital can be 
regarded as the cost of avoiding tranching. 
2. National tranching following by pooling. National debt could be issued in two or more 
tranches (Wendorff and Mahle 2015). The safe asset function could subsequently be 
performed by a diversified pool of senior national tranches. As with SBBS, ‘safety’ would 
be created through a combination of diversification and tranching, except in reverse 
order: first tranching, then pooling. This has the advantage that the tranching would be 
undertaken by the national issuers themselves, so that the approach could be 
implemented without any intermediation. However, because tranching is applied 
before risk is diversified, achieving the same expected loss as ESBies would require a 
higher subordination level – about 70%, rather than just 30% in the SBBS approach. 
3. E-bonds. In an idea going back to Monti (2010), a senior public intermediary would issue 
a single bond backed by a diversified portfolio of euro area sovereign debt bought at 
face value. The funding costs of the bond would be passed on to the sovereigns in 
proportion to the volumes of debt held in the portfolio of the public intermediary. As in 
the SBBS proposal, safety would hence be created through a combination of 
diversification and seniority, except that seniority now refers to the seniority of the issuer 
of E-bonds in the sovereign bond market, not to a senior tranche debt instrument. In a 
variant of this proposal, the safety of E-bonds could be increased further by endowing 
the senior public intermediary with some capital. This would make it similar to the 
capitalisation approach, except that much less capital would be required. 
4. Bonds issued by a leveraged euro area sovereign wealth fund. As in the capitalisation 
approach, a publicly owned, capitalised institution would issue debt backed by a 
portfolio of assets. However, this portfolio would be internationally invested to 
maximise long-term returns subject to a desired risk level. This would allow the 
intermediary to start small, based on some ‘seed capital’, and gradually grow in size by 
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reinvesting its earning and leveraging its capital subject to maintaining a prescribed 
capital adequacy. Once the desired size has been reached, the fund could start paying 
a dividend.  
5. Bonds issued by a central budget. Finally, a safe asset could be created in the form of 
euro area debt issued by a central budget (Ubide 2015). This debt would be sustained 
by either a euro area-level tax (such as a corporate tax or VAT) or by contributions from 
member states. As in the case of the SBBS, national tranching and pooling, and E-bond 
proposals, one can interpret ‘safety’ as arising from a mix of seniority and 
diversification. Diversification means that the revenues that are used to service the 
bonds are based on the economic strength of the entire euro area, while seniority 
means that taxes or contributions would be dedicated to the euro area budget and 
could not be diverted to other uses even if a member state is in fiscal distress. 
In Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2018a, 2018b), we evaluate and compare these proposals with 
ESBies based on: (1) the volume of safe assets that each approach could create; (2) the safety 
of these assets, particularly considering tail events; (3) their impact on sovereign borrowing 
costs and fiscal discipline; (4) possible redistributive implications; and (5) possible unintended 
consequences.  
Volume  
In the SBBS, capitalisation, national tranching and E-bond approaches, safe assets are backed 
by diversified portfolios of national debt. The maximum volume of safe assets that can be 
generated is hence constrained both by the desired safety level, reflected in a corresponding 
subordination level and a particular set of portfolio weights, and the available volume of euro 
area sovereign bonds.  
Because it requires a high subordination level, national tranching and pooling would have the 
lowest yield in terms of volume, capable of generating senior asset pools (that is, diversified 
baskets of senior national debt tranches) worth about 15-17% of euro area GDP – about in line 
with the volume of euro area general government debt securities that are currently held by 
euro area banks. SBBS can potentially create the largest volumes of safe assets, of up to 35% 
of euro area GDP, but this would require buying up to 80% of the German and French debt 
markets. If the intermediary is not allowed to buy more than 50% of each country’s debt 
market, the most efficient way of generating European safe assets would be via either SBBS or 
the E-bond approach, both of which could yield up to about a quarter of euro area GDP in terms 
of safe assets generated. Because the capitalisation approach is identical to SBBS except that 
the junior tranches are replaced by a capital cushion, it could deliver the same volumes as SBBS, 
but the required capital amounts are high. For example, generating 24% of GDP worth of safe 
assets would require 0.3*24 = 8% of euro area GDP in capital.  
The amount of debt that a euro area budget could sustain would depend on the revenues that 
are dedicated to it. For example, it can be shown that under a range of assumptions about 
growth and real interest rates in the euro area, a primary surplus of 0.5% could sustain debt of 
at least 25% of GDP.  
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Safety 
All approaches relying on diversified pools of national debt can be calibrated, using a given 
default simulation model, to target a particular expected loss rate. In that sense, all can be 
made equally safe. However, they differ in how these losses are distributed, particularly in the 
risk tail. These differences can be illustrated using a common measure for unexpected losses, 
the ‘value at risk’ (VaR). The VaR at probability p measures the maximum loss occurring with 
probability p or higher. Figure 1 shows VaRs for ESBies, national tranching and E-Bonds (in two 
versions, including a ‘capitalised’ version). VaRs corresponding to the capitalisation approach 
are identical to those shown for ESBies.  
Figure 1. Value at Risk of different approaches, at different thresholds 
  
Note:  This figure shows the Values at Risk (VaRs) of four potential safe assets, at different thresholds ranging from 5% to 0.5%, 
using portfolio weights derived in Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2018a). For ESBies, we assume the portfolio weights given by 
column (5) in Table C6 of Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2018a); for E-bonds, the portfolio weights in Table 3; for national tranching 
and pooling, the weights given in Equation 1 of Table 2.  
Sources: authors' calculations based on the simulation model of Brunnermeier et al. 2017.  
The figure shows that ESBies (and bonds issued by an equivalently capitalised intermediary) 
fully protect their holders against risks occurring with probability of about 4% or higher and are 
more effective than E-bonds or national tranching in protecting their holders against tail risks 
between about 2 and 4%, but are more vulnerable to extreme tail risks. This is because ESBies 
are fully protected against individual or multiple defaults by euro area member states whose 
total losses-given-default do not exceed the size of the non-senior SBBS tranches. Once this 
cushion is depleted, however, holders of ESBies would bear the full cost of further defaults. In 
contrast, E-bonds and national tranching bear losses any time the losses-given-default of a 
single country exceeds the portion of its debt held by subordinated debt holders. At the same 
time, they continue to offer partial or even complete protection (depending on loss-given-
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default assumptions) in the very unlikely event that countries such as France, Germany or 
Netherlands were to default in addition to lower rated countries.  
To offer better protection against severe defaults by smaller countries or combinations of 
smaller countries, the E-bond intermediary could be capitalised. Figure 1 shows that a 3% 
capitalisation (ten times less than what was required in the pure capitalisation approach) would 
offer the same degree of protection as ESBies for moderate tail risks together with much higher 
protection against extreme risks. Even if all euro area sovereigns defaulted, holders of 
capitalised E-bonds would only suffer losses in the order of 5% of face value. 
Borrowing costs 
All else being equal, the reduction of crisis risks associated with the sovereign exposure of banks 
should reduce borrowing costs over time. This said, not all might be equal – in particular, debt 
restructuring may become a more viable means for the resolution of debt crises. If so, the 
impact on borrowing costs might depend on a country’s fiscal position and growth prospects, 
raising borrowing costs for countries whose debts may not be sustainable, and lowering 
borrowing costs for other countries.  
The E-bond-proposal has an additional disciplining effect because bonds issued to the market 
would be subordinated to claims held by the E-bond intermediary. Since this implies that 
investors would bear higher losses-given-default, the marginal cost of debt issuance for 
countries that have reached their debt issuance limit to the E-bond intermediary would go up. 
However, this rise in the costs of borrowing from the market does not necessarily translate into 
a rise in overall borrowing costs. The reason is that a share of the debt is now being borrowed 
from the E-bond intermediary at the much lower German cost of borrowing (assuming that the 
E-bond was designed to exactly match the expected loss rate of the German bund), and the E-
bond issuer passes its low funding costs on to its borrowers. In Leandro and Zettelmeyer 
(2018a), we show that the net effect is to slightly raise average borrowing costs for the highest 
rated borrowers and to slightly lower average borrowing costs for the lowest rated borrowers. 
In contrast to E-bonds, ESBies would not subordinate national debt, only the non-senior 
tranches of SBBS. This said, they may “interfere” with national debt markets to the extent that 
they reduce liquidity, as debt purchased by the intermediary would be held to maturity and hence 
would no longer be available for trading. However, the SBBS proposal can be implemented in a 
way that would maintain large volumes of tradable national debt to preserve its liquidity (for 
example, 50% of the debt stock or 200 billion in tradable securities, whichever is smaller, see 
Leandro and Zettemeyer 2018a).  Furthermore, the presence of a large liquid market in euro 
area safe assets could reduce the costs of hedging euro area risks, reducing the cost of dealer 
inventories of sovereign bonds and raising liquidity in national markets (ESRB 2018). 
Redistribution 
Assuming they work as intended, the SBBS, capitalisation, and national tranching approaches 
all rule out redistribution because bond purchases occur at market prices. Assuming that prices 
reflect risk, there would hence be neither profits nor losses to be redistributed. A euro area 
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budget might lead to redistribution, but only if the expenditure side is designed to do so; a euro 
area sovereign wealth fund will avoid redistribution provided that profits and losses are 
distributed in proportion with the capital shares.  
This leaves the E-bond proposal as the main outlier. Redistribution arises because the funding 
costs of the intermediary are distributed to its debtors according to their portfolio weights, 
regardless of how much risk each debtor contributes. However, because of the E-bond 
intermediary’s senior creditor status, the redistributive effect would be quantitatively small. 
Simulations indicate that total redistribution could be in the order of €10 billion over five years, 
mostly at the expense of Germany (-3 billion) and France (-2.2 billion) and to the benefit of 
Greece (4 billion), Spain (1.4 billion) and Portugal (1 billion). Redistribution could be reduced by 
excluding exceptionally risky borrowers, such as Greece, from the portfolio, or by capitalising 
the intermediary in a way that reflects the contribution by each member state to the risks borne 
by the intermediary. 
Unintended consequences 
All proposals are potentially prone to ‘accidents’ that might prompt intervention by the ESM 
and/or the ECB, and hence carry mutualisation risk. However, the risk of such accidents could 
be kept very low through appropriate design. In the case of the euro area budget or wealth 
fund, this means choosing the revenue or contribution streams appropriately and placing limits 
on how they can be spent or invested. In the case of SBBS, bonds issued by a capitalised 
intermediary and E-bonds, the focus should be on minimising counterparty risks associated 
with the intermediary or intermediaries, as well as sovereign debt restructuring rules that 
ensure that intermediaries are not discriminated against (in the case of SBBS) or have their 
seniority respected (in the case of E-bonds). In the case of national tranching, the main worry 
is the greater volatility and potentially lower liquidity of junior debt issues, which might trigger 
faster loss of market access. This requires an ESM that is both large enough to prevent debt 
runs and capable of differentiating between debt runs and solvency problems.  
A frequent criticism of SBBS is that the junior tranches might not find any buyers in future debt 
crises, or perhaps even in normal times. It is easy to show that the latter fear is unwarranted, 
because SBBS, as analysed in ESRB (2018), would mostly reduce rather than increase the net 
supply of lower-rated sovereign and sovereign-based securities (since they ‘use up’ bonds in 
the same rating categories that would correspond to the junior tranches, see Leandro and 
Zettelmeyer 2018b). In debt crises, the junior tranches might indeed lose market access, but 
only if some of the countries in the SBBS portfolio also lose market access. It can be shown that 
if countries losing market access are excluded from the portfolio bought by SBBS issuers, and if 
sovereigns cannot discriminate against SBBS issuers in a default situation, then it is logically 
impossible for SBBS to lose market access. Furthermore, even if SBBS were to lose market 
access, the consequences would be benign, as countries could simply continue to issue 
sovereign debt directly to the markets. 
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Conclusion 
Most criticisms directed at SBBS/ESBies do not stand up to scrutiny. Furthermore, SBBS do well 
compared to several alternative proposals to create safe assets without member state 
guarantees. They would protect their holders against a wide range of risks, including correlated 
defaults.  They could deliver a relatively large volume of safe assets, in the order of 25% of euro 
area GDP, while maintaining liquid national bond markets. They would not impact the 
borrowing costs of sovereigns, and they would not lead to redistribution across countries. 
It would be possible to create a safe asset instrument without tranching – hence avoiding an 
aspect that SBBS critics frequently criticise – while mimicking the properties of ESBies in all 
other respects. However, this would require a high level of public capital, which would 
functionally play the role of the junior tranches, in the order of 25-30% of assets.  
At the same time, some competing proposals could be superior to ESBies in at least some 
dimensions. In particular, a lightly capitalised version of Monti’s (2010) ‘E-bond’ approach 
would have two advantages. First, it would offer the same protection as ESBies against 
moderate tail risks, and higher protection in extreme cases. Second, it would have a fiscal 
disciplining effect on sovereigns, by raising marginal borrowing costs of countries with high 
debt levels, without raising their average borrowing costs. Unlike SBBS, however, E-bonds 
would imply some (if modest) redistribution, and some stakeholders may not welcome their 
more pronounced impact on national bond markets. 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 23 October 2017 
Presentation by Jeromin Zettelmeyer, discussion led by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde 
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Roel Beetsma University of Amsterdam 
Mathias Dolls ifo Institute 
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde University of Pennsylvania 
Daniel Gros Centre for European Policy Studies 
Mark Hallerberg Hertie School of Governance 
Philippe Martin Sciences Po 
Roberto Perotti Bocconi University 
Pietro Reichlin LUISS Guido Carli University 
Jörg Rocholl ESMT Berlin 
David Thesmar MIT Sloan School of Management 
Jeromin  Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde recalled that the bank-sovereign loop does not only work through 
sovereigns. Bocola (2016) shows how banks suffer from a sovereign default through firms even 
if banks do not hold domestic government debt. He also pointed out the idea that the total risk 
in an economy remains unaffected, as explored by Barro et al. (2017). In effect, a safe asset for 
the euro area may just reallocate risk among economic agents. In addition, it is questionable 
whether a government would observe the seniority structure implied by national tranching if 
there were a default. A euro area budget or, also, ESBies would not suffer this problem. 
Daniel Gros challenged the assumption that diversification of government bond holdings would 
lead to large distributional changes. For instance, Italian banks have issued bonds while at the 
same time holding (Italian) sovereign bonds, earning a negative margin. Investors who invest 
in bank bonds could instead directly hold government bonds. Hence, banks do not provide 
additional demand for government bonds or stabilise markets. Jeromin Zettelmeyer found this 
empirical observation useful, but doubted the conclusion that government bond holdings by 
banks reflect irrationality. Daniel Gros pointed out that supervisory pressure may be at play. 
Roberto Perotti questioned the benefits of creating a safe asset. Italian banks or insurance 
companies would have fared worse during 2011/12 if they had held lower yielding ESBies 
instead of Italian government bonds. He also pointed out that it could be tricky to ensure the 
safety of revenue streams or senior tranches in situations such as the recent developments in 
Catalonia. Jeromin Zettelmeyer said that Italian banks may have simply been lucky during the 
crisis.  
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Daniel Gros argued that the higher risk inherent in Italian government bonds may have driven 
up the costs of capital for Italian banks. In turn, they would have benefited from a diversification 
of government bond holdings. Jeromin Zettelmeyer responded that the proposal does not try 
to address the issue of structurally weak banks. 
Jochen Andritzky suggested that any proposal would need to be robust relative to the different 
situations in which a sovereign default may occur. First, any proposal must not inhibit orderly 
debt restructuring of government debt as part of ESM-programmes as proposed by the GCEE 
(Andritzky et al., 2016). Second, any proposal would need to be robust in the case of a default 
due to unwillingness to pay. Third, a proposal must be able to cope with an exit. Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer responded that the first type is the one his proposal seeks to address. Willingness-
to-pay issues, however, are unlikely in the absence of disruptive political events. Exits are a 
relevant consideration, and ESBies would be less problematic than a euro area budget. 
Pietro Reichlin mentioned that Italian banks may be undervaluing risk in a gamble for 
redemption. Jeromin Zettelmeyer put this point in the context of the secondary market theory 
of debt underlying the proposal, coupled with moral hazard on the side of the sovereign. Home 
bias reduces the scope to restructure sovereign debt as banks will require a bailout.  
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6 Bank crisis management and resolution:  
What is missing?  
Nicolas Véron 
Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics 
In any financial system, arrangements for bank crisis management and resolution are a critical 
part of the prudential framework – even though in most cases, bank crises are typically 
infrequent and most of the ongoing prudential activity is about crisis prevention, mainly 
through adequate regulation and supervision. In the euro area, the bank crisis management 
and resolution framework has gone through a major dual shift in less than a decade.  
First, and as in the rest of the European Union (if not all other jurisdictions across the globe), 
the reference approach has shifted from ‘bail-out’ to ‘bail-in’. In these widely used semantics, 
bail-out refers to the public rescue of failing banks and reimbursement of their claimants with 
public funds; and bail-in refers to the forced imposition of losses on creditors of failed banks, if 
necessary through an administrative process by exception to normal insolvency law, or 
‘resolution’. The reference legislation for this shift is the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD), which was proposed by the European Commission in early June 2012 
following years of consultations, enacted in May 2014, and fully entered into force in January 
2016.  
Second, specifically in the euro area, and most unambiguously for the larger banks including all 
those with more than €30 billion in total assets, much (though not all) of the authority for crisis-
time decision-making has shifted from the national level to the European level. This authority 
is shared between the European Central Bank (ECB) as prudential supervisor; the newly created 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) as resolution authority; and the European Commission, through 
its Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), for the vetting of any financial assistance 
measures under the EU state aid control framework.1  
Each of these two shifts is momentous. Together, they represent nothing less than a regime 
change, with long-term structural impact for the euro-area banking sector and financial 
stability. In designing and implementing this massive policy transformation, the European 
Union has the basics broadly right. The new framework is much sounder than what it replaced. 
However, it is still incomplete, and a long learning path lies ahead.  
                                                     
1 The corresponding reference texts are the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation, proposed in 
September 2012, enacted in October 2013, implemented in November 2014; the Single Resolution Mechanism 
Regulation (SRMR), proposed in July 2013, enacted in July 2014, implemented in January 2016; and the successive 
“Banking Communications” in which the European Commission has detailed its approach to state aid control in 
the banking sector from 2008 onwards, the latest of which was published in July 2013 and entered into force the 
following month. 
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A policy regime change 
The policy regime during the first few years of the financial crisis was of implicit support to 
banks, going well beyond the explicit guarantee of insured deposits. Both the deposit insurance 
and the implicit guarantees took vastly different forms in different EU member states. The 
precise extent of support was left ambiguous, and was only revealed by reactions to individual 
crisis events. In some cases, it extended all the way to bank shareholders, namely, a bank that 
appeared to be failing or likely to fail would be purchased by national authorities for a positive 
(and in several cases significantly positive) price of total shareholder equity. Such cases included 
Fortis, Dexia, and RBS in September and October 2008.  
In other cases, national authorities extended explicit guarantees on bank liabilities well beyond 
insured deposits. Such guarantees could be provided either on a bank-specific basis, e.g. to IKB 
in Germany in late July 2007 (the first case of bank failure and rescue in the entire crisis 
sequence), or on a nationwide basis, e.g. in Ireland in October 2008. On October 16, 2008, EU 
political leaders jointly issued a statement that “The European Council reaffirms its 
commitment that in all circumstances the necessary measures will be taken to preserve the 
stability of the financial system, to support the major financial institutions, to avoid 
bankruptcies and to protect savers’ deposits”. While this statement left some space for 
interpretation as to the specific underlying policy stance(s), it was widely interpreted as 
signalling that no bank would be allowed to fail.2  
Cases of banks that appeared to be failing or likely to fail in 2007-09, and for which government 
financial intervention ensured that no creditor (even junior) would incur any losses, occurred 
in many EU member states including Belgium (Fortis and Dexia), Denmark (Roskilde Bank), 
France (Dexia), Germany (IKB, Sachsen LB, WestLB, Hypo Real Estate), Spain (Caixa Catalunya), 
the United Kingdom (Northern Rock, RBS) among others.  
As a consequence, however, public outrage against “taxpayer-funded bail-outs” grew in several 
countries – not least the United States, whose policy debates often influence European ones. 
A consensus then gradually crystallised that such a stance was excessively generous to bank 
managers, shareholders and creditors, and a potentially unsustainable commitment of public 
money. That unsustainability became observable shortly after the panic in the early autumn of 
2008. Ireland had a very large banking sector in proportion to its GDP, and had extended very 
generous guarantees. The resulting sovereign debt market tensions almost led to an IMF 
financial assistance program in early 2009, 18 months before an actual programme was 
requested and approved.3 Several member states, including the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Germany, adopted new legislation in 2009-10 to introduce a special bank resolution regime 
enabling various kinds of administrative bail-in of creditors, taking inspiration largely from 
longstanding US arrangements. The European Commission initiated consultations in 2009 on 
EU legislation to that effect, but though it took about three years before publishing an actual 
                                                     
2 See e.g. Andrew Hurst, “Left or right, European governments don’t let banks go bust,” New York Times, 
November 8, 2008.  
3 Donal Donovan, “The IMF’s Role in Ireland,” Background Paper BP/16-02/04, Independent Evaluation Office of 
the International Monetary Fund, July 2016, paragraph 53.  
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proposal for the BRRD (on June 6, 2012), it did signal its intentions with gradually increasing 
specificity in the meantime. On October 20, 2009, the Communication “An EU Framework for 
Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector” stated that “A European framework 
for bank resolution must therefore be based on agreed and common objectives which should 
ensure that losses fall primarily on shareholders and junior and unsecured creditors rather than 
on governments and taxpayers. (…) The overriding policy objective is to ensure that it should 
always be possible – politically and economically – to allow banks to fail, whatever their size”. 
Exactly a year later, another Communication, “An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the 
Financial Sector”, added that “The overriding objective of a European resolution framework 
should be that ailing institutions of any type and size, and in particular systemically important 
institutions, can be allowed to fail without risk to financial stability whilst avoiding costs to 
taxpayers. (…) In spite of the technical challenges presented by the design of a debt write-down 
mechanism, the Commission considers that it offers an additional resolution tool that would 
significantly enhance the ability of authorities to resolve LCFIs”.4  
Barely a few weeks after the Commission published its BRRD proposal on June 29, 2012, the 
euro-area countries launched the banking union project with a pledge “to break the vicious 
circle between banks and sovereigns” and to establish the SSM. Later in the same year, in 
December 2012, they decided to create a Single Resolution Mechanism, which further took 
shape in policy discussions throughout 2013 with the eventual agreement to create the SRB as 
a central hub for crisis management decision-making. The parallel legislative work on the BRRD 
and the SRMR eventually shaped the current regime.  
The new regime: theory and practice 
This regime can be summarised simply for the larger banks (or significant institutions) that 
together represent about four-fifths of the euro area’s banking system.5 The ECB, under its 
supervisory authority, may deem a bank to be “failing or likely to fail” (FOLTF) if its criteria for 
viability are not met. The SRB can also declare a bank FOLTF. Once a bank has been declared 
FOLTF, the SRB decides whether public-interest (i.e. financial stability) considerations justify 
triggering a resolution process. If so, the SRB decides on a resolution scheme, which is then 
executed by the relevant national authorities. If not, the bank is liquidated in a court-ordered 
process under national law(s). If a resolution process is undertaken, the SRB must ensure that 
no creditor ends up worse off than would have been the case in a court-ordered liquidation. If 
a bank is weak but not FOLTF, the BRRD allows national authorities to inject public capital into 
it under a process labelled “precautionary recapitalisation”, even though this must be done in 
compliance with applicable state aid control constraints (which currently entail loss-taking by 
shareholders and junior creditors).6  
                                                     
4 LCFIs refer to large and complex financial institutions.  
5 This analysis leaves aside the discussion of smaller banks, or less significant institutions in the banking union 
jargon, for which national variations are even greater, and public information is generally less complete.  
6 This chain of decision-making is summarised on the ECB’s website.  
54 | BANK CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION: WHAT IS MISSING? 
 
That is the theory. The practice is still at a very early stage, with barely more than two years 
since the regime fully entered into force in January 2016, and only a handful of cases. Even so, 
several issues have emerged. The SRB has had a somewhat challenging start.7 Its ability to form 
its own opinion on FOLTF status was not evident in the case of Italy’s Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 
which eventually benefited from a precautionary recapitalisation by the Italian state. The 
alternative between administrative resolution and court-ordered liquidation has been blurred 
by the cases of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca. After both these banks were 
declared FOLTF by the ECB in June 2017, the SRB decided not to take resolution action, but 
Italian law allowed the Bank of Italy to lead the liquidation process (under some judicial control) 
through a special regime of liquidazione coatta amministrativa, which suspiciously resembles 
resolution but without the BRRD constraints. In the case of Latvia’s ABLV, the SRB similarly 
decided not to go for resolution following the ECB’s FOLTF determination in February 2018. 
However, a complication arose as ABLV’s subsidiary in Luxembourg, despite being FOLTF in the 
ECB’s assessment, was not liquidated as the conditions for that were not found to be met under 
national law.8 Only one case, the resolution of Spain’s Banco Popular Español in early June 2017, 
has appeared to be broadly in line with the intent of BRRD legislators; but even there, many 
questions remain unanswered, and the decision-making process was marred by harmful leaks 
and miscommunications, leading to numerous ongoing lawsuits against both the SRB and the 
relevant Spanish authorities.  
It is to be expected that future cases will reveal other challenges or unintended effects of the 
new regime, including in countries such as France and Germany, where no significant case of 
bail-in has ever occurred since the start of the crisis, even of junior creditors. Such discrepancies 
between theory and practice can be viewed as largely inevitable given the magnitude of the 
policy shift. They are made potentially more problematic by the slow pace of EU legislative 
processes, which implies that even those shortcomings that have been clearly identified cannot 
be addressed swiftly.  
Reform prospects 
Realistically, legislative reform can be envisaged at the earliest only after the European 
Parliament election of May 2019. This is because of the clogged pipeline of ongoing legislative 
processes until the end of the current European parliamentary term, and despite the BRRD 
provision that calls for a legislative review by 2018.  
The main lesson of the early experience of the combined BRRD and SRMR is actually not about 
either legislation: namely, that the aim of a single bank crisis management and resolution 
regime requires harmonisation of national bank insolvency law. This is a logical and necessary 
implication of the very concept of a Single Resolution Mechanism: given the principle of “no 
creditor worse off”, the harmonisation of the resolution process under BRRD is not sufficient 
                                                     
7 See European Court of Auditors, “Single Resolution Board: Work on a challenging Banking Union task started, but 
still a long way to go”, Special Report 23/2017, December 2017; and also Nicolas Véron, “Bad News and Good 
News for the Single Resolution Board”, Bruegel Blog, 15 January 2018.  
8 See e.g. Roxana Mironescu, “ABLV takes ECB to court over ‘liquidation’ decisions,” Luxembourg Times, 7 May 
2018.  
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to harmonise resolution outcomes, and a harmonisation of the alternative (namely, liquidation) 
is needed as well. This inescapable reality, however, was omitted by policymakers during the 
2012-14 wave of legislation, possibly because harmonising insolvency law is immensely 
complex and difficult. A first attempt has been made by the European Commission, namely a 
limited harmonisation of the hierarchy of bank liabilities as part of a broader banking legislation 
package proposed in late 2015 (and still under discussion at the time of writing). The above-
mentioned early experience, particularly the cases of the two Veneto banks and of ABLV, 
suggest phasing out administratively-led national liquidation regimes such as Italy’s liquidazione 
coatta amministrativa, and separately, a provision that would force liquidation of a bank that 
has been declared FOLTF and for which no resolution action has been undertaken. It remains 
to be seen whether other future challenges can be addressed with ad hoc patches, or whether 
fuller harmonisation will eventually be needed in this area, possibly extending all the way to a 
single EU bank liquidation regime that may be adjudicated by a specialised EU-level jurisdiction.  
BRRD itself will surely call for revision in the future, but the practice so far has not revealed 
obvious flaws requiring urgent correction. In particular, any shortcomings in past cases of 
precautionary recapitalisation, one of the most contentious BRRD provisions, can and should 
be addressed through improved supervisory and state aid control practices, without legislative 
change.9 As for the SRMR, it is likely that the current, somewhat awkward division of labour 
between the SRB (in charge of deciding on the resolution scheme) and national competent 
authorities (in charge of the scheme’s ‘execution’) may lead to conflicts or dysfunction in the 
future. The fact that no such problems arose in the case of Banco Popular, the only one so far 
in which the SRB has taken resolution action, provides no reassurance, and that case has also 
shown that the division of labour does not inherently protect the SRB against judicial risk. A 
revision of SRMR that would entrust the SRB with full authority over the execution of resolution 
schemes appears advisable.  
Outside of the legislative realm, the European Commission will also need to adjust its state aid 
control framework to the changed financial context. The currently applicable Banking 
Communication was issued in 2013 in an environment of systemic financial fragility, which now 
no longer exists. This justifies consideration of a new Banking Communication, which may be 
published in 2018.  
Last, but evidently not least, the bank crisis management and resolution framework would be 
greatly improved by further euro-area-level pooling of public intervention tools that remain 
justified in the new context created by BRRD. This calls in particular for two reforms. First and 
most important, EU legislation should establish a genuine European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS) for countries participating in the banking union, that would protect all covered deposits 
equally and unconditionally. Second, the 2014 guidelines for the use of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM)’s bank recapitalisation instrument should be revised to allow the ESM to 
participate in precautionary recapitalisations if justified by European public-interest 
considerations, and also possibly to extend guarantees on bank liabilities if needed. Such steps 
                                                     
9 This point has been developed in further detail by the author in a study for the European Parliament: Nicolas 
Véron, “Precautionary recapitalisation: time for a review?”, republished as Bruegel Policy Contribution 2017/21, 
July 2017.  
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are certainly controversial, but are also necessary to reach the level of euro-area resilience that 
political leaders have called for.  
Conclusion 
The radical reform of bank crisis management and resolution in the euro area through the 
introduction of BRRD and the SRMR has withstood its first contacts with reality, but has not 
emerged entirely unscathed. At this point, the most glaring missing piece appears to be the lack 
of harmonisation in bank insolvency law, which, even under optimistic assumptions, will take a 
long time to remedy. Further lessons will be learned in future cases, and further legislative 
adjustments will be needed to make the framework more effective, efficient, and predictable.  
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 23 August 2017 
Presentation by Nicolas Véron, discussion led by Isabel Schnabel 
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Mathias Dolls Ifo Institute 
Augustin Landier Toulouse School of Economics 
José-Luis  Peydró Barcelona GSE 
Jörg Rocholl ESMT Berlin 
Isabel Schnabel University of Bonn, German Council of Economic Experts 
Dirk Schoenmaker Rotterdam School of Management, Bruegel 
Nicolas Véron Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
 
Isabel Schnabel highlighted five areas where the European resolution regime needs further 
improvements to become fully credible. First, the conditions for resolution tools are too vague 
and in part too weak, such as for the definition of “failing or likely to fail” or for precautionary 
recapitalisation. Second, an update of the Banking Communication is necessary to remove the 
misleading notion that bail-in of senior debt is not required. Third, the role of the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB) needs to be strengthened. Fourth, differences in national insolvency 
laws impede resolution, and harmonised tools such as a moratorium and out-of-court-settlement 
tool could be helpful. Fifth, too-big-to-fail considerations should become part of merger control 
procedures, as the resolution regime could lead to the creation of even larger banks. 
In his response to Isabel Schnabel, Nicolas Véron emphasised that too-big-to-fail was first 
raised as an issue in the US, at a time when Europe was not even able to handle the failure of 
small banks. This has now changed. He also clarified that bail-in is an administrative decision 
and hence different to an absence of a bail-out. Overall, despite the shortcomings pointed out, 
he reiterated his view that the system works. 
Dirk Schoenmaker pointed out that many issues with the current resolution framework are due 
to the coexistence of European and national legislation: “The system is walking on two legs.” A 
true banking union would require a single legislation for banks that are supervised, resolved 
and recapitalised by European institutions, and which participate in deposit insurance at 
European level. 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer agreed that too-big-to-fail is not an issue for the Commission’s DG 
Competition, while he shared the concern that large banks can become even bigger through 
takeovers of small ones in resolution. He also agreed that differences within national insolvency 
law pose a problem regarding the ‘no creditor worse off’-principle. 
In a short discussion on lending of last resort, Nicolas Véron clarified the difference between 
the recent cases in Italy and Spain. Since Italy provided guarantees to allow banks to access ECB 
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refinancing, liquidity was not an issue. In contrast, in Spain, the Bank of Spain decided to tighten 
conditions for ELA, which posed a problem for Banco Popular. 
Isabel Schnabel raised the point of credibility of bail-ins, offering the criticism that the bail-in 
of senior debt is not required by the current banking communication as it is widely assumed 
that senior debt is secured. Furthermore, the compensation for retail investors owning bail-in-
able instruments also undermines the severing of the bank-sovereign nexus. With regard to 
state aid, Nicolas Véron thought that – in the context of the crisis – DG Competition was right 
to distinguish between junior and senior debt. Now that the system is much less fragile, DG 
Competition should proceed to the next step and correct the perception that senior debt is 
protected. However, he warns against too hasty changes, pointing to the case of the US where 
the current system is the result of many decades of development. While echoing Isabel 
Schnabel on her critique on compensation for retail investors, he maintained it is not the 
European framework but the domestic authorities that failed in the area of consumer 
protection and should be criticised more vocally. 
Jochen Andritzky took up the criticism of the very tight conditions for ESM direct recapitalisation and 
noted that there are good reasons for them. Nicolas Véron recalled the history of the commitment 
to create such a facility and the apparent backtracking, mainly by Germany. He argued that the ESM 
has a banking department and suggested that, in cases such as that of Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the 
ESM should be able to offer banks a precautionary recapitalisation, without the many preconditions 
that are currently contained in the direct recapitalisation facility. Isabel Schnabel recalled the 
influence on banks of national authorities, especially with regard to domestic legislation, whereby the 
possibility of direct recapitalisation by the ESM would create the opportunity to shift the burden onto 
the European level. Jeromin Zettelmeyer agreed and thinks precautionary recapitalisation should 
initially be in the hands of national authorities. He also added that the possibility of direct 
recapitalisation was created to deal with the doom loop, and thus it is not reasonable to exclude using 
the instrument to deal with legacy problems. Dirk Schoenmaker took up this point, saying that only 
in a very few cases would a bank be too big to be recapitalised by the national authority of a large 
country, so this means that the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument would mostly serve as a 
backstop for small countries. He recalled the conditionality that is there to manage moral hazard 
issues, but also highlighted cross-border issues in rescues of international banks, notably the thorny 
question that may arise as to which national authority is in charge. 
José Luis Peydró thought the current framework presents progress, but also underlined the 
critique of takeovers of small banks by large banks. He pointed out more needs to be done to 
improve the current framework. 
Concluding the session, Nicolas Véron defended his view that precautionary recapitalisation is 
needed. The current way the conditions are drafted makes it difficult to assess the criteria. 
While the success of the case of Monte dei Paschi di Siena remains to be seen, he insisted the 
different treatment of the Greek banks and the Venetian banks is evidence that the current 
framework is broadly effective. 
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7 How should the euro area build a stable  
deposit insurance scheme? 
Dirk Schoenmaker  
Bruegel and Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University 1 
A key function of deposit insurance is to provide a credible safety net for depositors, one that 
is beyond doubt even in times of crisis. At the same time, as for any insurance scheme, there is 
an element of moral hazard: when depositors are protected by a supranational deposit 
insurance scheme, participating countries may be less strict about national banking policies. It 
is important to address these moral hazard concerns (which we do below). 
However, current proposals for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) with national 
compartments to address moral hazard (e.g. Gros, 2015; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018, further 
explained in Schnabel and Véron, 2018) may defeat the purpose of EDIS. The idea of national 
compartments is that the first part of the loss is borne at the national level, and only above a 
certain threshold are losses shared at the supranational level. The viability of particular national 
compartments may be questioned during a crisis and thereby worsen the crisis dynamics. A good 
deposit insurance should be a beacon of stability during a crisis, not a source of lingering doubts. 
Moreover, the euro area should maintain the rationale of Banking Union by designing a fully 
functional supervisory and crisis management system at the euro-area level (including 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) by the ECB and EDIS), as highlighted in the ‘Five Presidents 
Report’ in 2015. Deviations from the Banking Union principle of euro-area level banking policies 
would preserve the current practices of ring-fencing of capital and liquidity at the national level 
by national supervisors within the Banking Union. Furthermore, the euro area could simplify its 
crisis management framework by integrating resolution and deposit insurance in a Single 
Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board operating a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance 
Fund (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014). 
Gaining the trust of depositors 
In their seminal article, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show how bank runs occur in a fractional 
reserve banking system, whereby banks hold only a fraction of demand deposits in liquid funds 
and the remainder in illiquid loans. If rumours about a bank’s quality of assets start circulating, 
depositors will rush to the bank as withdrawals are on a first come, first served basis. A credible 
deposit insurance scheme prevents banks runs, as depositors can rest assured that their 
deposit is guaranteed up to a certain amount. 
                                                     
1 The author would like to thank Michel Heijdra and Nicolas Véron as well as seminar participants at LUISS Guido 
Carli University for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this contribution. 
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A deposit insurance scheme only works if it is enjoys the full trust of depositors. Ultimately, that 
trust is dependent on the provision of a credible fiscal backstop by the government 
(Schoenmaker, 2018). Once the market starts to question a country’s capacity (not only fiscal 
capacity but also political willingness) to support its banking system and related safety nets, 
then a deposit flight is difficult to stop. This was witnessed during the euro-sovereign crisis, for 
example in the cases of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The same happened during the Great 
Depression in the United States: state-level deposit insurance funds went bankrupt through 
lack of geographic diversification and size, thereby intensifying the banking crisis. One of the 
first actions of the then incoming President Franklin Roosevelt was the establishment of a 
deposit insurance system at the federal level, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
as part of the New Deal legislation in 1933 (Golembe, 1960). 
Regarding banks, it is important to contain the impact of the failure of one or more bank(s) with 
subsequent deposit insurance payouts on the remaining banks. Such payouts can weaken the 
banking sector, as banks fund the scheme both ex ante and ex post. A large failure with 
uncertain payouts (the exact losses at the failing bank(s) are not directly known because of 
fluctuating asset values in times of crises) can set up a negative trust spiral in the case of smaller 
deposit insurance funds. A case in point is the failure of the medium-sized bank SNS in the 
Netherlands in February 2013. While the preferred option was a closure with bail-in and deposit 
insurance payouts, this created potentially large ex post contributions from the surviving banks 
to the deposit insurance fund as the value of SNS’s commercial real estate portfolio was difficult 
to establish. That was seen as possibly weakening the surviving banks, still in the midst of the 
crisis. The government therefore decided to nationalise SNS and imposed a one-off levy on 
banks to co-fund the rescue. This bank levy was a fixed amount and created no uncertainty for 
the surviving banks. 
Finally, the adverse selection and moral hazard aspects of deposit insurance should be 
addressed to minimise the exposure of the government as fiscal backstop for deposit insurance. 
To counter adverse selection, weak banks should not be allowed in. Existing banks need to be 
cleaned up through the removal, or full provisioning, of non-performing loans. New entrants 
should be checked before a licence is granted. Once banks are in, supervisors should monitor 
them in day-to-day supervision. These licencing and supervisory powers are now in the hands 
of the ECB as the central banking supervisor in the Banking Union.  
Therefore, smaller deposit insurance funds are more vulnerable, as witnessed in the early 
1930s in the US and more recently in Europe, while a large fund with a credible fiscal backstop 
stabilises the banking system (Schoenmaker, 2018). 
National compartments may weaken the structure 
Notwithstanding the weakness of smaller funds, several authors propose to keep either 
national deposit insurance systems (Gros, 2015) or national compartments (Bénassy-Quéré et 
al., 2018) in EDIS. The idea of national systems or compartments is to limit cross-border 
solidarity, because of lack of political support for a full EDIS. It means that the first part of the 
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loss is borne at the national level, including partial clawback (Gros, 2015) or ex post fees 
(Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018). 
As banks often fail in times of recession, payouts typically occur when the surviving banks are 
also not in very good shape. If they are obliged to refill the national compartment through 
future contributions (regular contributions and ex post contributions), this could destabilise the 
national banking system. These national banks will also become weaker in comparison with 
banks from other countries in the eurozone. In this way, a national compartment may be self-
defeating and reduce the stability of a national banking system. 
A second-round effect may be that the credit function of banks is hampered as they become 
capital constrained (credit crunch). This has a negative impact on the economy. Figure 1 shows 
the vicious cycle between a national banking system and the domestic economy (Véron, 2017). 
Figure 1. Bank – sovereign linkages 
 
Source: Véron (2017) 
A final consequence of national compartments (and the current provision of ELA by national 
central banks) is that national supervisors would see the need for national banking supervision 
to remain in place. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) argue the opposite. As EDIS with national 
compartments would operate under a single authority in their proposal, there would be no 
need for national requirements. However, the national compartments would continue to rely 
on ex ante and ex post contributions of the respective national banks. National supervisors 
could therefore (informally) require that ‘adequate’ liquidity and solvency is available at these 
national banks (including national banks that are a subsidiary of banks headquartered in 
another – euro-area – country) to fulfil their potential obligation to the national compartment. 
The result is that ring-fencing practices, such as local liquidity and capital requirements, would 
continue to hamper full integration, with cross-border banking flows, of the Banking Union. The 
gaming between banks and national supervisors – banks threaten to convert cross-border 
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subsidiaries into branches when local requirements become too burdensome – would not end 
(see Schoenmaker and Véron, 2016). Schnabel and Véron (2018) propose new EU legislation to 
eliminate geographical ring-fencing, but ring-fencing is a supervisory practice, which is difficult 
to erase (fully) by legislation.  
Addressing moral hazard 
Moral hazard can be addressed in several ways. First, concentration limits on sovereign bond 
holdings at banks are crucial in order to reduce the sovereign risk in bank balance sheets 
(Véron, 2017). Second, the current efforts of the ECB and European Commission to reduce the 
share of non-performing loans (NPLs) should be pursued with vigour. Banks should be cleaned 
up before they enter a fully mutualised EDIS. A transition period is necessary for reducing 
sovereign concentrations and NPLs while building up the mutualisation of risks in EDIS. Third, 
the ECB as central supervisor in the Single Supervisory Mechanism should be tough in their 
licensing and supervision of banks (ex ante prevention). For future NPLs, the ECB should, for 
example, lay down strict provisioning rules (with mandatory write downs after a few years). 
A final mechanism for mitigating moral hazard concerns is the introduction of a country 
component in the risk-based premium for deposit insurance, as proposed by Bénassy-Quéré et 
al. (2018). If a country has weak banking policies, such as weak creditor rights, lengthy 
insolvency procedures, lax provisioning policies or permissive housing finance, the country risk 
premium can be higher for that country (providing an incentive to improve banking policies and 
phase out differences). The risk-based premium, which was already foreseen in the 
Commission’s original EDIS proposal, would then have a bank-specific risk component and a 
country-specific risk component. Importantly, the risk premium should be set by the integrated 
Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board, outside the political arena. Moreover, the range 
for risk differentiation, from 0.5 to 2 times the calculated premium, should be widened. The 
European Banking Authority (2015) currently determines the risk range, based on powers 
delegated under Articles 10 and 13 of the European Deposit Guarantee Directive (2014/49/EU). 
EDIS integrated within Banking Union 
EDIS should become an integral part of a completed Banking Union. Figure 2 provides a 
schematic view of such a completed Banking Union. In earlier work (Sapir and Schoenmaker, 
2017), we propose that the ECB should become the lender of last resort providing ELA and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) should become a European Monetary Fund (EMF), 
providing a credit line to the new Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Fund when needed 
(in addition to its main task of backstopping countries in need). 
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Figure 2. European institutions for financial supervision and stability in a Banking Union. 
 
Note: The framework illustrates the five stages from rulemaking to the fiscal backstop. The bottom line shows the agency for 
each function.  
Source: Schoenmaker (2013). 
Here, we elaborate on the idea of integrating the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and EDIS into 
a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board (SRDIB). Moreover, in line with our earlier 
proposal (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014), we also recommend integrating the two funds, the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and the European Deposit Insurance Fund (EDIF), into a Single 
Resolution and Deposit Insurance Fund (SRDIF). This would follow the practice of the FDIC in 
the United States and the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ), which combine the 
resolution and deposit insurance functions and manage one fund. 
A first advantage is that this simplifies crisis management. There are currently too many players, 
which makes crisis management more difficult. Experienced crisis managers know that crisis 
management complexity increases exponentially with the number of players and the speed of 
action slows down accordingly. The SRDIB could apply the least cost principle, which requires 
the resolution authority to choose the resolution method in which the total amount of the 
expenditures and (contingent) liabilities incurred has the lowest cost to the resolution and 
deposit insurance fund (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014). The three basic resolution methods for 
failing banks to choose from are liquidation with a deposit payout, a take-over with public 
support and direct public support. The lowest cost solution can be selected within the SRDIB 
instead of in a protracted fight between the SRB and EDIS. In most cases, this would result in 
liquidation with deposit insurance payout (as the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive 
created preference for claims on bank assets of the deposit insurance funds over other 
creditors – except for covered-creditors), unless there is a public interest in preserving certain 
critical functions of a troubled bank (resolution funding is then allowed under state aid rules). 
A second advantage is that an integrated fund fully exploits the pooling potential of insurance. 
Not only national funds, but also resolution and deposit insurance funds are pooled into one 
fund. After a transition period, the euro area should have a proper functioning Banking Union 
with a fully funded Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Fund. We propose a 2% target fund 
SRDIB ECB EC/EBA EMF ECB 
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ratio for the joint fund of SRDIF, similar to the FDIC. The current target fund ratios are 1 per 
cent for SRF and 1.5 per cent for EDIF (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Target size of the Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Fund (end-2017). 
 SRF EDIF Total SRDIF 
Target fund ratio 
(as % of covered deposits) 
1% 1.5% 2.5% 2% 
Target size (in € billions) 54.6 81.8 136.4 109.1 
Available funds (in € billions) 17.4 20.1 37.5 37.5 
Available as % of target size 32% 25% 28% 34% 
Note: Covered deposits of eurozone banks amount €5,456.6 billion at end-2017 (end-2016 for available funds at EDIF). Some 
countries have only recently converted their ex post funded deposit insurance scheme into an ex ante funded scheme, which 
explains the limited available funds. During the build-up of the ex ante schemes, these countries can still impose ex post 
contributions on the participating banks.  
Source: Author calculations based on EBA (2017) and SRB (2017). 
While current national funds are typically too small to deal with one large bank failure, the new 
fund, once fully up and running at €109 billion (Table 1), could handle up to two large bank 
failures (or multiple smaller failures) in the euro-area without problems. A conservative 
assumption is that equity capital needs to be replenished in a rescue operation (Schoenmaker, 
2018). The average equity of the top 10 euro-area banks amounts to around €60 billion 
(updated from Schoenmaker and Véron, 2016). These estimates are based on the upper range 
of support operations during the Global Financial Crisis. The (partial) application of the new 
bail-in regime would reduce the potential size of public support, allowing the fund to deal with 
more large failures. 
Focusing on EDIS only, Carmassi et al. (2018) also find that a euro area deposit insurance 
scheme is more stable than national compartments or national systems under different stress 
and bail-in scenarios. In their simulations, risk-based contributions can internalise specificities 
of banks and banking systems. There would be no unwarranted systematic cross-subsidisation 
within EDIS in the sense of some banking systems systematically contributing less than they 
would benefit from EDIF. 
A final point is the scope of the SRDIF. The less significant institutions (LSIs) are already covered 
by the Single Resolution Mechanism (all euro-area banks) and the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (the ECB is in the end responsible for all euro-area banks). We suggest 
incorporating the LSIs in the SRDIF, as separate funds for LSIs in each country will tend to be 
small and thus unstable, as argued in the earlier sections of this contribution (see Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2018) for a similar view). A different and politically contentious issue is what to do 
with the current institutional protection schemes (IPS), which imply mutual risk sharing among 
its members (small savings banks or cooperatives). 
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Conclusions 
The eurozone needs to address moral hazard concerns arising from European deposit 
insurance. These justified concerns can be alleviated through a country-specific component in 
the risk-based premium for deposit insurance and limits on sovereign bond exposures on bank 
balance sheets. But proposals to maintain (permanently) national compartments in a new 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme are self-defeating, as such compartments can be 
destabilising in times of crisis. 
This paper proposes to integrate not only the two agencies for resolution and deposit insurance 
into a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board, but also the underlying funds into a Single 
Resolution and Deposit Insurance Fund. This would simplify crisis management procedures and 
reduce the required funding. 
Finally, we argue for maintaining the Banking Union rationale throughout the framework. The 
bonus would be a fully integrated Banking Union market, in which current ring-fencing practices 
are phased out.  
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 19 March 2018 
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Nicolas Véron Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
 
In this discussion, Nicolas Véron first emphasised his agreement with Dirk Schoenmaker on 
many issues, such as on the need for a European deposit insurance system (EDIS) in general, 
rules to address sovereign concentration risk, a credible European backstop, and levies based 
on the quality of creditor protection policies.  
He then contrasted Schoenmaker’s concerns to the actual proposal in the Franco-German euro 
report (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018; further explained in Schnabel and Véron, 2018). In the 
report, national insurers are phased out and all money is managed centrally. No distinction is 
made between an idiosyncratic bank failure and a systemic banking crisis, as mutualisation kicks 
in automatically when the national compartment is depleted. Hence, no national supervision is 
needed and there is no reason for national ring-fencing. The pace of replenishing the 
compartments can be fine-tuned in order not to put the recovery at risk. Daniel Gros 
emphasised that in his proposal of a reinsurance system (Gros, 2015), the sovereign feedback 
loop would similarly be severed as the national deposit insurers are not connected to the 
national sovereign. 
Referring again to the Franco-German report, Nicolas Véron argued in favour of national 
compartments. Besides any political considerations, the economic rationale for national 
compartments is to account for persistent national differences and better align incentives. He 
further argued that national compartments would not reinforce the ‘vicious circle’ between 
banks and sovereigns, as they would be fully managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and 
remain completely disconnected from sovereign governments. 
Nicolas Véron agreed with the presenter that deposit insurance should be integrated with bank 
resolution under the roof of the SRB. Yet, even if the SRB managed both the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF) and the European Deposit Insurance Fund (EDIF), tensions could arise over which of 
the funds to use in a crisis. Dirk Schoenmaker pointed to calculations that the joint amount of 
the funds would need to be less than their sum if managed separately, and that joint 
management would also ease governance complications. Nicolas Véron agreed, but warned 
that a full merger of the two funds (resolution and deposit insurance) may not be politically 
achievable. 
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Daniel Gros raised the question of the supplementary role of (private) deposit insurance 
systems as risk mitigators. At least in Germany, the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (BDB) as 
well as the deposit insurance system of the Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe may have pushed their 
member banks towards de-risking. He wondered whether deposit insurance systems in other 
countries could play a similar role. Nicolas Véron agreed but warned that at least some of these 
systems are perceived to enjoy implicit government guarantees, reinforcing the bank-sovereign 
feedback loop. In the proposal in the Franco-German report, BDB could definitely keep its 
present top-up scheme, and could also conceivably open it up for non-German banks to 
become members. 
Jochen Andritzky questioned whether a European deposit insurance system could do anything 
against capital flight in presence of exit risk. If a crisis were to lead to a country trying to leave 
the euro, EDIS could hardly be credible enough to contain a deposit flight to banks in other 
member states. He hence doubted EDIS could prevent destabilising capital flight so long as exit 
risk remains. In the case of an exit, Dirk Schoenmaker thought that in a fully funded state, EDIS 
funds would be paid to the exiting country following some allocation rule, e.g. based on bank 
contributions or the ECB capital key. Nicolas Véron recalled that the possibility of euro exit is 
not enshrined in the Treaties and an exit would therefore trigger a highly political ad hoc 
negotiation. However, the existence of EDIS would reduce the risk of scenarios in which a 
government decides to exit, for instance in response to a retail bank run, to safeguard the 
payment system. It would also create a “common good” that, all things equal, raises the 
political price of exit, at least for weaker countries.  
All participants agreed that ex ante rules for an exit from the euro area would be 
counterproductive. Daniel Gros raised the possibility of a country exiting the euro but staying 
in the Banking Union. In the subsequent discussion, participants disagreed on the extent to 
which a government trying to exit from the euro could exploit a joint deposit insurance, and 
whether this is a relevant scenario. 
Dirk Schoenmaker raised the issue of replenishment of the fund through increased premia 
which may pour oil onto the fire of a crisis-shaken banking system. Nicolas Véron emphasised 
that from the depositor’s point of view, the proposed system would be country-blind. Jochen 
Andritzky doubted whether varying contributions between countries are politically acceptable 
and sufficient to address differences in national settings, such as creditor rights. 
Jörg Rocholl, Dirk Schoenmaker and Nicolas Véron then discussed data sources for a 
comparative analysis of deposit insurance systems. While there is some data and descriptions 
available (e.g. from the EBA), a detailed overview, including private sector schemes, maintained 
by a competent EU authority (Commission, EBA or SRB) would be helpful. 
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8 A Euro Zone Basket as stabiliser for the euro area? 
Dietrich Matthes 
Quantic Risk Solutions  
Jörg Rocholl 
ESMT Berlin 
The causes of the European debt crisis – as seemingly diverse as the member states of the 
European Union itself – had one thing in common. Regulators and policy-makers alike did not 
anticipate the degree to which liberties in sovereign debt management could become an 
existential threat to the entire EU financial system. Indeed, as subsequent analysis and debate 
has revealed, regulatory systems even acted as enablers. The 2015 European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures, for example, noted 
that, despite numerous historic examples of sovereign defaults, regulatory treatment routinely 
ignored the possibility of sovereign default and risk.1  
The cost of such negligence on the European body politic is more than financial. As recent 
elections across the European Union have shown, the management of the European debt crisis 
became a strong factor in spreading political instability. Voters who suffered through austerity 
measures imposed thereafter by the European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) on their countries rallied against the government leaders whom they perceived as 
capitulating to external interests at their expense. As recently as May, a Reuters headline on 
political turmoil in Italy called it a “referendum on the euro” and quoted a far-right political 
leader as saying “Italy is not free; it is occupied financially by Germans, French and eurocrats”.2 
Understanding and challenging (poor) sovereign debt practices – and their enabling regulatory 
frameworks – are imperative to strengthening the European Union against threats, both fiscal 
and political. The Euro Zone Basket (EZB) proposal – which we first detailed in a white paper 
entitled “Breaking the Doom Loop”3 – aims to achieve this. It acknowledges the critical impact 
that the sovereign-bank nexus has in national and European financial (in)stability. It offers a 
simple formula for regulating sovereign debt that embraces already tried-and-true private-
sector approaches to risk management via capital and liquidity assessments. 
                                                     
1 ESRB Report on the Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures. European Systemic Risk Board, Mar. 2015. EU 
catalogue number QB-02-15-139-EN-N,  
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/esrbreportregulatorytreatmentsovereignexposures032015.en.pdf 
2 “Italy’s Fresh Election Risks Being Referendum on Euro.” Reuters, 29 May 2018. www.reuters.com, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-euro-election-analysis/italys-fresh-election-risks-being-
referendum-on-euro-idUSKCN1IT1IF 
3 Matthes, Dietrich, and Jörg Rocholl. Breaking the Doom Loop: The Euro Zone Basket. ESMT White Paper, 2017, 
http://static.esmt.org/publications/whitepapers/WP-17-01.pdf 
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The sovereign-bank nexus and the doom loop 
Among the critical flaws revealed in the post-crisis scrutiny of the eurozone’s financial 
infrastructure and processes was the sovereign-bank nexus, the dominant financial relationship 
between domestic commercial banks and their sovereigns. The nexus is grounded in two major 
phenomena.  
First, as hinted at above, regulatory frameworks privilege sovereign debt over others, granting 
zero capital requirements. Commercial banks are assumed to otherwise practice their due 
diligence in assessing and covering the risks of their assets and investments, and thusly 
regulated. Similar levels of scrutiny are wholly absent in the sovereign-banking nexus. That is, 
where regulators require commercial banks to mitigate their risks, purchases of sovereign 
bonds carry no such requirements. As the 2015 ESRB report noted, regulators in the EU as 
elsewhere routinely categorise government bonds as high-quality and highly liquid assets. This 
zero-risk assumption flies in the face of years of historic examples, analysis, theory, and best 
practices in financial risk management – effectively a loophole for sovereigns in the regulatory 
treatment of debt. 
Second, while foreign lenders and credit rating agencies may reject sovereign debt holdings 
based on their own risk assessments, research has shown that domestic banks have a sovereign 
debt home bias. While partly the perception of domestic banks and their sovereigns as ‘natural 
allies’, analysis published by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, for example, points to 
other voluntary and involuntary choices.4 These can be driven by the regulatory advantages 
described above, on the one hand, or government pressure on domestic banks to hold 
sovereign debt, on the other, among others.  
As a 2017 Bloomberg article succinctly described, these two phenomena are both part of the 
sovereign debt doom loop, “whereby weak banks can destabilise governments that support 
them and over-indebted governments can push banks holding their bonds over the precipice.”5 
Despite the evidence of its critical role in the European debt crisis, the sovereign-bank nexus 
has yet to be sufficiently challenged at either national or EU levels. In fact, according to a recent 
brief published by the Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) of the European Parliament, 
commercial banks throughout the European Union and the European Economic Area continue 
to hold significant ratios of domestic sovereign debt.6 While the report acknowledges the ideal 
that this represents – an ideal in which sovereign debt is truly safe and highly liquid – the reality, 
according to the report’s authors, is that inattentiveness to these ratios can also result in costly 
bank bailouts, vulnerability to rating downgrades, and overall financial economic instability. 
Indeed, in the vortex of an economic crisis – represented by the fierce competition of interests 
                                                     
4 Horváth, Bálint, et al. “European Banks’ Sovereign Debt Home Bias: Voluntary or Involuntary?” VoxEU.Org, 31 
July 2015, https://voxeu.org/article/determinants-bank-s-sovereign-debt-home-bias 
5 “Europe’s Sovereign-Bank ‘Doom Loop’ Can’t Be Broken.” Bloomberg.Com, 15 Dec. 2017. www.bloomberg.com, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-15/europe-s-sovereign-bank-doom-loop-can-t-be-broken 
6 Banks’ Exposures to Home Sovereign Bonds. European Parliament, Economic Governance Support Unit, Feb. 
2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/574391/IPOL_ATA(2016)574391_EN.pdf 
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between commercial and domestic banks, regulators, credit rating agencies, private investors, 
and the greater public – the sovereign-bank nexus could deal the critical blow.  
The EZB solution 
As economists and policymakers have increasingly (and critically) noted, the debt-driven ties 
that exist between sovereigns and their domestic banks have been shown to make sovereigns 
uniquely vulnerable to financial crises and – in the case of the European Union – deeply 
threatening to a stable monetary union. However, whether due to regulatory privilege or home 
bias, sovereigns and their domestic banks have seen little incentive to change. Regulatory 
reform proposals that include cross-border asset pooling and tranching of government debt 
securities – and that continue to promote those debts as ‘low-risk and high-rated assets’ – may 
not foster efforts to stimulate higher levels of cross-border investment by banks.  
Here is where the Euro Zone Basket (EZB) aims to offer a solution. 
The EZB method starts with the acknowledgement that any approach that increases regulatory 
complexity or imposes inflexible limits – especially for the most-likely-affected sovereigns and 
their domestic banks – would face resistance from private players and contribute to the political 
pressures and instability results previously described. In the case of proposals that include 
pooling or tranching, for example, anything that requires commercial banks to commit to risks 
not of their own choosing (e.g. by being offered sovereign debt assets ‘en bloc’ only) may be 
perceived as threats to their independence. That is, the regulatory path ahead must be 
illuminated by a commitment to simplicity, transparency, and cooperation. 
The EZB offers a far simpler approach. It is a straight-forward mathematical formula to reduce 
the privilege of/bias for domestic sovereign debt by requiring appropriate, grade-rated capital 
provisions for domestically concentrated sovereign debt holdings (based on a rating-grade-
based calculation akin to the Basel 2 IRB formula). Simultaneously, it reduces capital provision 
requirements on foreign sovereign debt holdings – again, compared to risk-based capital 
requirement computation. Thereby the EZB stimulates interest in cross-border sovereign debt 
investment by commercial banks and hence leads to more diversified sovereign debt portfolios 
and better-integrated European capital markets. 
Best, the EZB method does not require the formation of another EU agency, does not prescribe 
asset portfolios, nor does it overestimate the willingness of sovereigns to institute limitations 
for themselves. Not only is it manageable, it truly supports the ideals of a functioning and fully 
integrated monetary union. 
Leveraging ECB capital keys 
National central banks (NCBs) each have shares in the European Central Bank (ECB). These are 
weighted equally by the EU member state’s share of the EU’s GDP and total population. The 
country’s share – its capital key – is expressed by a percentage that is adjusted every five years 
and with the entry of every new country into the Union.  
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For the purposes of the EZB calculation, the member state is i and its capital key is CKi and it 
would determine what percentage of a bank’s total sovereign bonds would be permissible 
without requiring capital provisions. This capitalisation-free amount is expressed in the EZB 
calculation as a sum (si). 
Of course, any commercial bank remains free to determine for itself what its total position of 
sovereign debt is, with respect to corresponding supervisory bodies. It is that total amount 
(expressed as S in the EZB calculation) from which the capitalisation-free amount would be 
calculated.  
That is, a capitalisation-free sum (si) equals the bank’s total available sovereign debt sum (S) 
multiplied by the capital key percentage (CKi) or 
si = S * CKi 
Any commercial bank that wishes to hold an excess of sovereign bonds – that is, any sovereign 
debt, domestic or foreign, above the corresponding, capital-key-determined amount available 
for that country – would require capital provision corresponding to standard formulas for 
associated risk weights, such as those provided by the Bank for International Settlements (i.e. 
as per the Basel 2 IRB formulae).  
That is, what is to be capitalised (ci) equals the larger amount of total sovereign debt of country 
i (ai) less the capitalisation-free sum (si), or  
ci  = ai – si 
There are, of course, some caveats. One, this would apply only to those sovereign debts that 
have investment grade ratings. Where this is not the case, those sovereign debts would be 
subject to appropriate risk-based capitalisation requirements regardless of whether 
concentrated or not in the portfolio of any commercial bank. Secondly, limitations on 
capitalisation-free (si) and capitalised (ci) concentrations of sovereign debt may also have to be 
applied.  
Conclusion 
The assumption of risk-free sovereign bonds has underpinned the financial systems of the EU 
and others. Regulatory treatments thus have had low or zero capital requirements for 
sovereign debt. 
The sovereign-bank nexus – which has been supported by this regulatory privilege in risk 
assessment and a sovereign debt home bias – contributed mightily to the European debt crisis 
and subsequent political instability throughout the European Union. Economic and political 
experts have increasingly agreed that the doom loop of crises between weak banks and over-
indebted governments can only be broken by regulatory reform that appropriately assesses 
sovereign debt risks and directly challenges the sovereign-bank home bias by incentivising 
cross-border sovereign debt holdings by banks.  
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Unlike pooling, tranching, and other reform proposals, the proposal of a Euro Zone Basket (EZB) 
avoids the tendency toward institutional complexity by embracing conceptual consistency and 
mathematical simplicity. By leveraging the capital keys of the European Central Bank, regulators 
can use the EZB’s simple, transparent, and fair formula for calculating a capitalisation-free sum 
that any commercial bank can hold of a sovereign debt and reinsert standard risk assessment 
and capital requirements for additional holdings. 
The EZB method is consistent with the standards of international credit rating agencies and 
applications of risk weights, and is also respectful of sovereignty concerns for public and private 
interests. The EZB offers a model for financial reform that is also reflected in the ideals of the 
European Union itself – encouraging investment and cooperation for the mutual benefit of all 
its member states. 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 29 November 2017 
Presentation by Jörg Rocholl, discussion led by Sam Langfield 
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Roel Beetsma University of Amsterdam 
Mathias Dolls ifo Institute 
Daniel Gros Centre for European Policy Studies 
Sam Langfield European Central Bank 
Álvaro Leandro Peterson Institute for International Economics 
Dietrich Matthes Quantic Risk Solutions 
Pietro Reichlin LUISS Guido Carli University 
Jörg Rocholl ESMT Berlin 
Nicolas Véron Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics 
Jeromin  Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
Sam Langfield agreed it is imperative to break the doom loop and to reinvigorate the process 
with fresh ideas. The proposal by Dietrich Matthes and Jörg Rocholl included several nice 
features such as its simplicity, its use of the ECB capital key, and the recognition that there are 
genuine prudential reasons for banks to hold sovereign bonds. However, the proposal has 
limitations such as achieving only limited diversification, since sovereign bonds rated AA- or 
better retain a zero risk weight. If the framework had been in place in 2007, many banks would 
have held sovereign bonds that later turned out to be risky, without any incentive to diversify 
those holdings ex ante.  
Sam Langfield also emphasised that the proposal would only achieve incomplete de-risking, as 
the response of banks to the proposal depends on the elasticity to capital charges of their 
demand for sovereign bonds. Their risk profile may increase, as they may reallocate their 
portfolio from components subject to non-zero risk weight into other sovereign bonds, and in 
all likelihood buying the highest yielding and most risky sovereign bond conditional on receiving 
a 0% risk weight. In his view, reforms that induce banks to reduce their exposure to domestic 
risk, but increase that to foreign risk could therefore be counterproductive. This motivates the 
search for the ‘holy grail’ of a safe euro asset, which banks could use to both diversify and de-
risk their sovereign bond portfolios. 
In his response, Jörg Rocholl emphasised that the proposal follows the internal rating based 
(IRB) approach and thus does include risk charges even for bonds rated AA- or better. Dietrich 
Matthes agreed that the risk may increase for low-risk banks diversifying their holdings. 
However, the proposal includes a tolerance for excess holdings subject to an individual limit. 
The paper has not fully calibrated this, and those parameters could be adapted over time.  
Jeromin Zettelmeyer agreed with the Sam Langfield’s comments but thought the argument of 
limited de-risking was taken too far: whether expected losses go up or down for particular 
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banks is unlikely to serve as a good guide to whether a doom loop is in effect. Rather, the 
concern is with non-linear effects that are hard to gauge. Therefore, the proposal probably 
makes the system much safer despite not fully addressing the doom loop concern. 
Diversification should reduce overall risk. Nicolas Véron also wondered whether the median 
expected loss is a proper way to reflect systemic risk and recalled that home bias, not 
investment in public debt, is the salient European issue. Sam Langfield responded that in his 
view, even a state of partial diversification could increase the risk of contagion, hence 
incomplete diversification should remain a concern. 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer also asked how the authors view the risk that the introduction of such a 
scheme could trigger a crisis. Jörg Rocholl responded that Italy is the weakest link. However, 
there are three counterarguments. First, the share of Italy in the basket would also be large, so 
demand from other countries could be significant. Second, the buffer leaves some room for 
banks to retain some larger exposure to the sovereign bonds of their home countries. Third, 
the proposal would phase in over time, e.g. over seven to ten years. But a close look is 
warranted in order to avoid additional risk in the system. Dietrich Matthes added that the 
regulatory incentives of the proposal would make it attractive, for example, for Spanish banks 
to reinvest capital-free in other countries, such as Italy. 
Pietro Reichlin asked why Spanish banks do not buy Italian bank obligations already. Dietrich 
Matthes suggested one reason is the segmentation of primary markets. Nicolas Véron pointed 
out recent work by Altavilla et al. (RoF, 2017), which presents a great literature review and 
empirical analysis of the origins of home bias. Jochen Andritzky added that it is far from clear 
how portfolio re-allocations induced by regulatory changes affect pricing, see for instance 
Andritzky (2012). 
Roel Beetsma pointed out that diversification has declined and market segmentation has 
increased since the start of the crisis. For the attractiveness of the proposal, it is important to 
understand the drivers behind this trend. If governments try to persuade local banks to buy 
their debt, any proposal limiting this may be politically unworkable. Jörg Rocholl argues that the 
regulation actually provides banks with incentives to withstand pressure from the government. 
Jochen Andritzky recalled the GCEE proposal putting an emphasis on hard exposure limits, given 
that without them you would not achieve the necessary diversification. With limited granularity 
in the euro area – a few large countries and highly correlated shocks – the benefit of 
diversification is limited. Nicolas Véron added that redenomination risk played a major role in 
the past crisis. In his view, a regime with smooth restructuring that can credibly reduce 
redenomination dangers would reduce overall risk. 
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9 Risk sharing and financial integration: How can the 
Capital Markets Union deliver? 
Diego Valiante 
European Commission1 
Since 2008, Europe has been hit by multiple structural shocks, which led to a significant increase 
in unemployment rates, negative growth and widespread losses across the financial system. 
The following credit crunch created uneven access to finance across the EU, especially for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) operating in countries relying on non-domestic capital flows. 
Following the introduction of the euro, the rapid expansion of the interbank market boosted 
price convergence, especially in those markets such as the one for government bonds that 
relied on the activism of wholesale liquidity operators. When the shocks hit, market reaction 
and disorderly government interventions led to massive retrenchment in capital flows and ring-
fencing of liquidity by national supervisors. This plunged Europe into financial fragmentation: 
what had hitherto appeared as a shiny example of financial integration quickly became an area 
where interest rate differentials were increasingly reflecting country risk over credit risk.  
The missing link: private risk sharing 
The lack of diversification in capital flows2 quickly became the obvious culprit behind the 
growth of financial instability and was seen as a major constraint on Europe’s economic 
recovery. This was particularly true for euro area countries that could rely less on their fiscal 
capacity to absorb risk by acting countercyclically (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2014, Alcidi et al. 2017). 
Overall, private risk sharing mechanisms are the biggest risk absorption component in more 
complete monetary unions than the European Monetary Union (EMU), e.g. the United States 
(see chart below). The methodology developed by Asdrubali et al. (1996) defines the biggest 
private risk sharing component as ‘international factor income’. It includes both cross-border 
credit and capital markets activities.3  
Interestingly, public risk sharing components (e.g. fiscal transfers) become much more 
important when crises hit, but only part of this public risk sharing works ex ante. In fact, the 
greater relative importance of fiscal transfers is higher after the crisis (as Figure 1 suggests). 
This could also be due to the depletion of the absorption capacity of cross-border credit and 
capital markets, which are de facto automatic stabilisers (i.e. working ex ante). 
                                                     
1 The author’s views are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission. 
2 For an overview of the state of Europe’s financial structure and its capital markets; see Valiante (2016), Chapters 
2 and 3. 
3 What is called ‘credit channel’ in Asdrubali et al. (1996) is de facto public and private savings. Balli et al. (2012) 
have also measured the ‘capital gain’ component of holdings (including foreign assets), which would be implicitly 
caught by savings, in order to have a more complete picture of the impact of financial integration. 
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Figure 1. Risk sharing in Europe and the United States 
 
Source: Based on Furceri & Zdzienicka (2013)^, Asdrubali et al. (1996)’ and Milano & Reichlin (2017)*. 
Intertemporal and cross-sectional private risk sharing 
While the discussion on the private risk sharing function of financial markets (Arrow 1964, Allen 
& Gale 1995, 2000) and its relationship with financial integration (Obstfeld 1994) is not new, 
private risk sharing mechanisms are an essential complement to price convergence indicators 
in measuring the quality of a financial integration process, which also influences further 
financial development (Valiante 2016, 2018). Policy intervention is thus focusing on those 
private risk sharing mechanisms (financial structure) with greater impact on risk absorption and 
ability to complement (or even replace) more ambitious actions on public risk sharing.  
However, our private risk sharing target (international factor income, IFI) is an indicator that 
captures both intertemporal and cross-sectional risk sharing. In terms of financial structure 
policies, these are two completely different policy targets. Intertemporal risk sharing includes 
institution-based finance, intergenerational solidarity and asset accumulation. While asset 
accumulation and intergenerational solidarity are either captured by public risk sharing 
components or savings, the intertemporal absorption capacity generated by cross-border 
entity-based (traditional bank) finance is part of IFI.  
Intertemporal risk sharing is very effective in absorbing temporary sectoral shocks, rather than 
permanent ones (due to its concentrated and illiquid nature). Relationship banking has the 
virtue of being a stable funding source over time, but with high switching costs (mostly 
embedded in the type of relationship).  
On the contrary, cross-sectional risk sharing (i.e. market-based finance) is much more able to 
absorb structural shocks due to its risk dispersion and subsequent higher liquidity (led by 
standardisation). Risk is split and spread across a large number of agents. Listing on public 
markets to raise equity at a specific point in time (i.e. when the discounted value of future of 
earnings is the highest) can result in a much larger injection of funds than entity-based funding 
tools can ever provide. Market-based finance is thus more suitable for illiquid projects, as the 
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propensity to take risk by fund providers is structurally higher than institution-based finance, 
due to risk dispersion.4  
Figure 2. Intertemporal & Cross-Sectional Risk Sharing characteristics 
 
Source: Author. 
Cross-sectional risk sharing policies: The Capital Markets Union 
Developing policies for private risk sharing mechanisms is very complex. A minimum level of 
public risk sharing is often necessary to make the private leg work, such as in the case of Banking 
Union’s backstop to resolution. Currently, two long-term European projects are explicitly 
working on private risk sharing channels. 
The Banking Union aims to sever the link between member states and their local banking 
system in order to open the way for an EU-wide market in banking services, along with the 
support of new technological advances. The project will strengthen the cross-border 
intertemporal private risk sharing channel in the euro area.  
The Capital Markets Union (CMU), instead, aims at building up cross border cross-sectional risk 
sharing capacity, i.e. fostering capital market integration across the EU. The complexity of the 
policy intervention here arises from the dispersed nature of market-based funding. To simplify 
the issue, we can go back to a financial contracting approach (Valiante 2016). There are two 
fundamental stages in financial contracting: contracting itself and renegotiation. Contracting 
has to deal with specification costs – the costs of being unable to foresee all circumstances 
related to a future project. The higher the uncertainty about future outcomes, the greater the 
specification costs. Renegotiation, instead, is mainly affected by monitoring costs – the costs of 
being unable to monitor how the contract is performed and eventually exit the contract 
(typically on secondary markets) as a form of renegotiation. Specification costs tend to lead to 
adverse selection, while monitoring costs to moral hazard.  
On the one hand, reducing specification costs in market-based financial contracting implies 
more efficient (informed) pricing mechanisms and better third-party risk signal mechanisms 
(e.g. ratings). Availability and comparability of data are key to achieving an efficient pricing 
mechanism (price discovery) that could unleash market-based private risk sharing at the 
                                                     
4 Recent empirical evidence suggests a relationship between development of market-based finance and 
improvements in Total Factor Productivity; see Giordano & Guagliano (2016). 
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European level. The current situation is far from ideal.5 For instance, the supervision of 
accounting standards and auditing companies, a federal prerogative in the United States since 
the introduction of accounting standards and the establishment of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1933, is left to national supervisors that often leave a lot of discretion to local 
companies (and also exploit the discretion given by the accounting principle being applied). 
Basic company data, stored in business registries, are not standardised and pooled together at 
EU level. Credit reporting is hardly accessible and comparable across member states. This lack 
of data availability and comparability creates insurmountable obstacles for third-party 
gatekeepers, like credit rating agencies and auditing companies, in offering important tools like 
high yield bond ratings or EU-wide market research.  
On the other hand, reducing monitoring costs for renegotiation in a dispersed environment 
implies strong enforcement powers, including sanctions, fiduciary duties and an efficient 
judicial system, as well as effective third-party monitoring, including an active market for 
corporate control. For instance, the judicial system in most European countries is under-
resourced and inefficient, including when it comes to insolvency procedures. Taking many years 
to perform a contract or liquidate a company is a major obstacle for renegotiation through exit. 
Enforcing a contract or liquidating a company is a less liquid form of secondary market, but it 
is still a fundamental renegotiation phase. A weak enforcement mechanism leads to 
uncertainty about the loss given default (LGD) that an investor can factor into pricing, when 
considering the investment in the first place. Liquidation and insolvency procedures are largely 
different across Member States. The United States introduced a Bankruptcy Code at the end of 
the 19th century from which individual States could deviate, but it gave the default rule for 
deviations to be more easily priced when defining the LGD. Currently, there is no common 
framework in the EU, but an attempt to coordinate via a regulation that only deals with a 
narrow set of aspects of insolvency procedures.6 Other reforms are key for cross-border 
market-based risk sharing, such as a stronger European supervisory framework, higher 
sanctions (e.g. illicit profits restitution) and redress procedures. 
Moreover, pricing in cross-border capital markets can internalise, in terms of higher or lower 
prices, divergences among member states that are known and predictable ex ante, including 
different tax rates. Nonetheless, they fail to do so when uncertainty affects predictability. For 
instance, this is the case for some discretionary insolvency decisions, among others, on 
secondary proceedings in cross-border insolvency, where the judge is left to decide with no 
objective criteria that can be easily identified ex ante. While some level of discretion is always 
necessary in insolvency proceedings, these situations should be limited to the minimum 
necessary to allow the smooth liquidation of the company.  
Finally, the history of the United States suggests that it is unlikely there will be higher cross-
border capital market activities if there is no greater trade activity in goods and services, which 
currently remains barely above 25% of GDP within the EU, a smaller proportion than trade 
                                                     
5 For a comprehensive review, see Valiante (2016), Chapter 4. For the comparative analysis with the United States, 
see Valiante (2018). 
6 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings. 
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activity with non-EU countries (Valiante 2018). An active market for corporate control, 
combined with strong antitrust powers that create ex ante deterrence, are essential features 
for single market activities. Among others, Europe’s competition powers are well used in cross-
border situations, but less so when it comes to policing national markets.7 This has major 
implications, especially when the national market is worth more than 20% of Europe’s 
economy. More invasive competition policies are key for greater cross-border trade and, with 
it, capital movement (including capital markets activities). 
Conclusions 
The CMU is an important tool to rebalance ‘overbanked’ Europe’s financial structure (ESRB 
2014) with more cross-sectional private risk sharing. But capital markets are complex legal and 
economic structures that, compared to institution-based private risk sharing, rely on public 
information flows (e.g. accounting standards and credit reporting) and strong enforcement 
tools (e.g. areas of common supervision and insolvency proceedings). These are areas that have 
been historically left to the legal prerogatives of member states due to their limited importance 
for institution-based private risk sharing, such as traditional relationship lending, which is the 
dominant funding source for the European economy. Post-crisis financial reforms have undoubtedly 
improved information flows, but much still remains to be done on cross-border comparability 
and private/public enforcement tools to reduce specification and monitoring costs. 
Moreover, there is an important underlying question that concerns the role of trade. If intra-
EU trade in goods and services remains stagnant, capital will not follow and policies will not 
have sufficient political strength to overcome the significant vested interests that rely on the 
almost irrelevant size of cross-border flows to preserve their national rents. Stronger 
competition policies at national level across the EU is probably a necessary pre-condition. 
Finally, a successful CMU is not a big-bang project that can deliver its benefits with concentrated 
action on few clear levers. It is rather a long-term project that needs to move step-by-step and 
gradually raise its level of ambition, with constant reviews, to adapt to evolving circumstances. 
A measure of success for the CMU will be how much of the liability side of non-financial 
corporations will remain reliant on bank funding and unlisted equity, as well as what proportion 
of household financial assets will be sufficiently diversified through capital markets 
instruments. It is not obvious what the optimal threshold should be, but there will be time to 
assess this on Europe’s long journey reducing overreliance on local institution-based funding.  
 
  
                                                     
7 See, inter alia, European Commission, “Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: 
Achievements and Future Perspectives”, COM(2014) 453 final (hereafter European Commission 2014). 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 23 April 2018 
Presentation by Diego Valiante, discussion led by Jochen Andritzky 
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Daniel Gros Centre for European Policy Studies 
Jörg Rocholl ESMT Berlin 
Diego Valiante European Commission 
 
In his discussion of the paper, Jochen Andritzky raised three issues. First, the European financial 
system is predominantly bank-based which in part reflects its economic structure (GCEE Annual 
Report 2015, paragraphs 440ff). While the Capital Market Union (CMU) can improve financing 
opportunities and risk diversification, it is unlikely to replace the dominance of bank financing. 
Better risk sharing through banks, including through completing the Banking Union and 
facilitating the formation of pan-European banks, is therefore an equally important element. 
Second, to overcome home bias, more forceful measures may be required. While it is important 
to address issues such as differences in accounting and reporting practices or taxation, these 
measures will not suffice. In some areas, for instance on insolvency frameworks, differences 
reflect strong voter preferences or vested interests. Measures, such as concentration limits for 
sovereign exposures, may be needed. Diego Valiante recalled the importance of trade 
integration in facilitating close financial integration: trade drives financial integration, not the 
other way around. 
Third, Jochen Andritzky noted that obstacles to deeper integration are multi-faceted and 
prioritisation is needed. Policymakers should focus on those measures that enhance shock 
absorption. Some evidence (such as EC 2017) does not provide clear evidence of strong risk 
sharing even when home bias is low. To justify why more capital market integration (and no 
fiscal capacity) is needed for shock absorption, a better understanding is necessary of what 
fosters shock absorption and does not generate undesirable contagion. In response, Diego 
Valiante recalled that negative risk sharing mostly originates from procyclical capital flows. In 
banking, long-term cross-border loans offer more risk sharing than overnight interbank lending. 
Jochen Andritzky furthermore raised the issue of debt bias in corporate financing related to 
the tax deductibility of interest expenditures. To this end, the GCEE introduced a concrete 
proposal for transition to a neutral tax treatment in Germany (GCEE Annual Report 2012, 
paragraphs 402ff). Daniel Gros mentioned the experience in Belgium, where the introduction 
of tax rules to allow a deduction of notional interest rates on capital did not produce an effect. 
Currently, low interest rates reduce the relevance of this issue. 
Diego Valiante agreed on the relevance of harmonising insolvency frameworks. The European 
Commission’s proposal for early restructuring could be a preliminary step towards 
harmonisation. Jochen Andritzky pointed out that in normal times, investors tend to pay little 
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attention to insolvency frameworks. Diego Valiante disagreed and noted that investors are not 
deterred by higher costs if known ex ante, but by leeway for discretion that cannot be priced, 
in particular regarding stays in proceedings that are often at the discretion of courts. Insolvency 
laws provide the loss given default (LGD) of a capital market exposure. 
Jörg Rocholl asked whether a conclusive list of barriers to capital market integration had been 
identified. Diego Valiante replied that there is no conclusive list, but that there are important 
areas where action could be considered. For instance, insolvency proceedings, where the 
possibility of opening secondary proceedings in another member state creates uncertainty, is 
one of them. Furthermore, different interpretations of accounting standards are a barrier, for 
instance with regard to adjusted profits or lifetime losses. He recalled that from the outset the 
US harmonised accounting standards and supervision under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) at the federal level. 
Jochen Andritzky questioned whether price convergence is a relevant measure as price 
differentiation is a sign of functional market discipline. Diego Valiante agreed that the 
convergence of sovereign bond yields may be misleading as indicator of financial integration, if 
there is no convergence in risk sharing across the region. Generally, the convergence of prices 
is not a good indicator for capital market integration, as long as the investor base remains 
domestically concentrated.  
Jochen Andritzky also raised the issue that national authorities may have a preference to 
maintain the current fragmented market structure, as demonstrated by the opposition of debt 
management offices to Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (SBBS). Diego Valiante agreed that 
national interests are strongly in play, especially when it comes to promoting more supervisory 
convergence, for instance, via passing more responsibility to European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA). 
Daniel Gros recalled that securitisations make up a large part of capital markets. Diego Valiante 
noted that large-scale guarantees helped to create deep markets for mortgage-backed 
securities in the US. In his view, creating equally deep markets in Europe would also require 
some level of support through public guarantees, even if they create distortions. Daniel Gros 
remarked that in total, the US did not incur losses on such guarantees. Jochen Andritzky and 
Jörg Rocholl pointed out that several European countries feature sizable markets for mortgage 
securitisations subject to particular regulations, such as the German Pfandbriefe. 
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10 Enhancing the ESM? 
Jochen Andritzky 
Bruegel1 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was created as a crisis mechanism for the euro area 
as a means of preventing and resolving the coordination failures in financial markets that can 
lead to a financial crisis. It complements the existing euro area architecture built around 
national responsibility for fiscal policies, whereby common fiscal rules safeguard fiscal 
sustainability, and (predominantly) euro area responsibility for banking and capital markets as 
well as monetary policy.  
A stronger financial safety net helps prevent financial crises and minimise welfare losses if they 
occur. As a regional financial arrangement, the ESM complements existing institutions such as 
the IMF (Weder and Zettelmeyer, 2017). IMF (2016) describes the objectives of the global 
financial safety net as (i) providing insurance against idiosyncratic and systemic shocks, 
including contagion; (ii) supplying temporary financing to support smooth policy adjustment; 
and (iii) incentivising strong macroeconomic policies to prevent crises and make economies 
more resilient. 
Recent discussions on how to strengthen the euro area have brought vastly different concepts 
of how to enhance its crisis mechanism to the surface. Although the term ‘European Monetary 
Fund’ dominates the debate, the ESM is a fiscal, not a monetary backstop. Many proposals for 
a European Monetary Fund – such as Sapir and Schoenmaker (2017) – address a broader range 
of issues. Notably, some contributions aim at more ambitious objectives, such as a deepening 
of political union or as a lever for large-scale fiscal risk sharing. This contribution focuses narrowly 
on how to enhance the ESM’s lending toolkit in order to improve the euro area’s financial safety 
net within the ESM’s current legal statute and its current envelope of available resources. 
Cornerstones of an effective crisis mechanism 
Enhancing the ESM should not lead to a transfer union. Instead of fiscal transfers, other 
channels of shock absorption – in particular cross-border investments – are the bedrock of a 
stable euro area. By preventing liquidity crises, a credible crisis mechanism facilitates private 
risk sharing as investors can have confidence that there will be fewer crisis situations or that 
crises will cause less disruption. The ESM therefore complements the Banking and Capital 
Markets Unions. To determine the ESM’s optimal design it is important to ask how crises occur 
                                                     
1 The author would like to thank the ESM, the ‘Future Europe’ forum, and the German Council of Economic Experts 
for helpful discussions and comments. The views expressed herein should only be attributed to the author and to 
none of these institutions. 
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and how can they be prevented or mitigated. For brevity, the following discussion focuses on 
sovereign debt and not banking crises. 
Sovereign debt crises typically start with a loss of access to market financing. Such losses of 
market access may arise from an (irrational) financial panic unrelated to a country’s long-run 
solvency or policies. For example, a country may be hit by contagion from crises elsewhere. In 
the case of such a ‘liquidity crisis’, the ESM is clearly welfare enhancing (Mussa et al., 2000; 
Jeanne et al., 2004). In practice, however, pure liquidity crises unrelated to solvency concerns 
are the exception (Weder and Zettelmeyer, 2017). Most such crises are related to concerns 
about a country’s solvency, albeit sometimes not obvious at the outset.  
To prevent the official lending mechanism from lending to insolvent countries, crisis lending 
requires strong policy conditionality. Strict conditionality represents an important element of 
ESM lending anchored in the ESM Treaty. Its key role was confirmed by the EU Court of Justice 
judgement in the Pringle case. Policy conditionality strives to address solvency concerns by 
conditioning access to financing on implementing appropriate economic reforms. 
Crisis lending may cause severe problems down the road if policy conditionality is not observed. 
This can result in credit losses for the ESM and hence moral hazard at the expense of the 
European taxpayers. Therefore, in addition to conditionality, the ESM requires a credible 
framework to restore public debt sustainability, such as through the restructuring of sovereign 
debt. Today, this element is not yet sufficiently clearly laid out in the euro area’s official lending 
mechanism (see Chapter 4).  
As crises are rarely unrelated to policies, it is important to consider the incentive effects of a 
financial safety net. Just as air bags might induce less-careful driving, a crisis mechanism may 
induce politicians to adopt unsound policies, or financial markets to continue to finance 
misconceived policies. Avoiding adverse incentives is even more important in the euro area, 
where member states retain substantial sovereignty in economic and fiscal policymaking. This 
often thwarts initiatives for more risk sharing in the euro area, as some member states fear 
they will be forced to pay for others’ policy actions. For example, the showdown in 2015, 
resulting from Greece’s uncooperative negotiation tactics, created concern in creditor 
countries of being taken hostage by debtor countries. A similar theme may be at play in Italy 
today. Therefore, adverse incentives deserve to be a main consideration in the ESM’s design. 
Policy conditionality can be applied ex ante in the form of preventive policies and ex post, 
ensuring conditional debt sustainability as discussed above. While much attention is paid to ex-
post conditionality – the policies agreed upon for crisis programmes – ex-ante conditionality 
offers a very powerful way to provide positive incentives for strong policies. Since ex-ante 
conditionality can help to prevent crises, it can improve welfare compared to a purely ex-post 
approach (Jeanne et al., 2001). Currently, the ESM relies on ex-ante conditionality only for its 
precautionary facilities, which remain unused. The following focuses therefore on a proposal 
for a precautionary credit line and discusses selected facilities that should be at the centre of 
ESM reform.  
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Prequalification facility 
Currently, the ESM offers two types of precautionary credit lines, the Precautionary 
Conditioned Credit Line (PCCL) and the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL). To date, no 
member state has yet requested a credit line. This mirrors the experience of the IMF, for which 
two key reasons have been identified. First, signing up to a precautionary facility is seen as 
sending a negative signal that a country believes it may become a victim of crisis. Second, while 
the idea is that a subscribing country is prequalified for emergency lending, access may be 
limited or additional conditionality may apply. This may induce policymakers to remain 
unconstrained by ex-ante conditionality, and negotiate conditionality only once in need of 
emergency lending (Enderlein and Haas, 2015). 
Generally, the situation of the euro area is ideally suited for a wider use of precautionary 
instruments. In many areas, common policies such as fiscal rules already bind national 
policymaking. Ex-ante conditionality can very easily be fitted to common policies and provide 
an additional incentive for compliance. Instead of signalling a vulnerability, countries signing up 
for such a credit line receive a stamp of approval. Given that the credit line provides positive 
incentives, it could be labelled the prequalification facility, available to all member states that 
undergo regular check-ups. While participating in the facility is welcome, reliance on it as a 
regular source of funding is not the intent of this proposal. Hence, strong institutional 
safeguards are needed to ensure the credit line is only drawn on under exceptional and 
unintended circumstances. 
The choice of prequalifying criteria should be limited to those relevant for preventing economic 
crises, limiting their scope, and ensuring debt sustainability. Overloading the criteria with too 
many issues should be avoided, much like conditionality for crisis programmes (Tumpel-
Gugerell, 2017; Wyplosz, 2017). Yet, compliance with a clearly defined set of rules – as in the 
proposal of a “discount window” by Enderlein and Haas (2015) – may be too automatic and too 
weak to prevent the ESM from lending to insolvent member states.  
The ESM could conduct annual surveillance in close liaison with the European Commission, 
guided by principled criteria similar to what exists for the current PCCL. Based on this, the ESM’s 
top decision-making body would take a decision, possibly with additional qualifying elements, 
such as a discount on access or conditions on drawing on the prequalification facility. In 
addition, continuous monitoring would ascertain whether any policies are being implemented 
that could severely alter the qualification assessment. In this case, access to the credit line 
would be suspended. A requirement to reapply for the facility (rather than an automatic 
extension) could reduce political pressure to soften ex-ante conditionality and overcome the 
challenge of withdrawing access to the credit line during difficult times. 
When a shock hits, the prequalified member state could draw on the credit line within limits 
necessary to safeguard the ESM’s funds. Maximum access should be restricted to about one 
year’s gross financing need, and full repayment is required. 
Member states that satisfied the prequalification criteria could also be granted higher access, 
longer maturities, or lower interest rates under other facilities. In other words, if more crisis 
funds are needed and the country decides to apply for other facilities (with ex-post 
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conditionality), a more comprehensive backstop and more gradual adjustment could be offered 
depending on the country’s track record of strong policies as demonstrated under the 
prequalification facility. 
In addition, rules for creditor participation could be designed in a way to limit debt restructuring 
for crises in countries with a prequalification facility. In this case, prequalification would send a 
positive signal to markets. However, limiting creditor participation must be weighed against the 
credit risk possibly incurred by the ESM. 
Crisis facility 
The ESM facility of macroeconomic adjustment programmes deserves strengthening in two 
aspects. First, a framework for creditor participation should be more firmly embedded as a 
condition for accessing the facility, as is discussed in Chapter 4 of this publication. Second, 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes could be more explicitly tailored towards achieving 
growth-enhancing structural reforms. 
Both elements go hand in hand. Given that first-stage sovereign debt restructuring to extend 
maturities would markedly reduce financing needs, part of the funds preserved could be used 
for programme designs with longer adjustment periods and more gradual fiscal consolidation 
(Andritzky et al., forthcoming). Adjustments in the euro area are harder to achieve given 
internal devaluation, which relies on domestic price adjustment, is hampered by price rigidities 
common across the euro area (IMF, 2015). Accordingly, programme design should reflect the 
need to phase fiscal adjustment in respect of the delays with which some structural reforms 
bear fruit. This could improve programme ownership by the countries requesting assistance. 
Furthermore, such design squares well with the current approach of providing loans with long 
maturities and lending terms that support solvency. 
In contrast to the proposal by Gros and Mayer (2017), access under macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes should not have an explicit pre-set cap as long as the borrower fulfils 
certain criteria. This mirrors the policy for IMF Standby Agreements and boosts the credibility 
of the ESM crisis backstop. To make this work given the current resources of the ESM, Creditor 
Participation Clauses (as discussed in Chapter 4) are essential in order to limit financing needs 
for highly indebted countries. 
Backstop facilities 
In addition to offering facilities to member states, the ESM could backstop the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF) and possibly a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS, see Chapter 7). This paper 
will not discuss the economic case for the SRF or EDIS but acknowledges the necessity of a 
common backstop to enhance their effectiveness. Using the ESM as a fiscal backstop would be 
a pragmatic solution given its readily available funding operation and its ability to take decisions 
relatively swiftly. 
Given the Banking Union is key to severing the sovereign-bank nexus and reducing the 
likelihood that a banking crisis spills over into a broader economic crisis, it would be consistent 
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with the purpose of the ESM to backstop the SRF and EDIS. However, appropriate assurances 
should be given to safeguard ESM funds, given the ESM does not have direct powers to enforce 
the replenishment of SRF or EDIS through levies on the respective banking systems of member 
countries. This could be done, for instance by conditioning the SRF’s access to the ESM backstop 
on bank repayment capacity, similar to the requirement set for the borrowing arrangement 
between the FDIC and US Treasury, or a requirement to treat the ESM as a senior creditor.  
Conclusion 
This contribution proposes enhancing the ESM through small but powerful reforms of its 
lending toolkit. Other aspects, such as improving ESM governance or its instruments to deal 
with banking crises are not part of this contribution. However, enhancing the ESM’s credibility 
as a backstop in a sovereign debt crisis through reforms to its lending toolkit should be more 
conducive to euro area financial stability than changing its legal statute, a contentious and 
misleading focus of the current discussion.  
By exploiting the power of ex-ante conditionality and a credible framework for creditor 
participation, the current resources of the ESM could provide a more credible crisis backstop. 
A prequalification facility subject to ex-ante conditionality suits the current framework of common 
policies well, and could strengthen incentives to comply with good policies while overuse of 
this credit line must be avoided. A framework for maturity extensions and, if needed, deeper 
debt restructuring, limits credit risk for the ESM and reduces funding needs. These savings, in 
turn, could be used to grant longer programmes and a more gradual adjustment that is more 
suitable to achieving structural reforms. In addition, by assuming the role of backstop for the 
Banking Union, the ESM could contribute to reducing risks from banking crises. 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 18 December 2017 
Presentation by Jochen Andritzky, discussion led by Dirk Schoenmaker  
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Dirk Schoenmaker Rotterdam School of Management, Bruegel 
 
Dirk Schoenmaker pointed out first that if countries lose market access and turn to the ESM, 
then doubts about solvency cannot be excluded. This may make (ex post) conditionality 
necessary for precautionary instruments. Second, the safety net provided to banks at national 
level should also be mirrored at the euro area level. If banks are subject to European 
supervision, a ‘lender of last resort’ function at the euro area level and ESM direct 
recapitalisation have to be available. Current conditions for direct recapitalisation are too 
restrictive to make the instrument useful. As the funding needs for bank recapitalisations are 
typically limited (e.g. €20 billion in the case of ABN Amro), this instrument is not a major strain 
on ESM resources (a recapitalisation amounts to some 4.5% of assets). While the bail-in regime 
is welcome, it may not be realistic to achieve a full bail-in of 8%, especially for G-SIBs. Proper 
concentration limits for sovereign bonds are important, but risk reduction and risk sharing need 
to move together. Finally, unanimity gives small countries veto powers and can prevent 
decisions being taken swiftly - the case of Slovakia serves as reminder. Sapir and Schoenmaker 
(2017) propose an 85% supermajority (although the threshold is not decisive) to prevent small 
countries holding up decisions. 
Jochen Andritzky responded that in the case of ESM involvement, the two-stage sovereign debt 
restructuring process developed by the GCEE could apply (see Chapter 4). It foresees first a 
maturity extension when debt is high and, in a second step, resolves any solvency concerns 
with a restructuring during the course of the ESM program. Regarding bank recapitalisation, a 
strong framework needs to be in place to insulate bank management from political influence. 
Majority voting may raise constitutional issues not just in Germany, but also in other (possibly 
small) member states. 
Daniel Gros agreed with the latter point and highlighted an update of his recent work with 
Thomas Mayer (Gros and Mayer, 2017). A key difference between the IMF and ESM is the 
magnitude of fiscal risk at stake. In addition, lending conditions differ. The IMF’s preferred 
creditor status and penalty interest rates are only feasible for relatively low lending volumes, 
not for financing as much of the public debt stock as the ESM does, for instance, in Greece. 
Therefore, ESM lending should be limited to about five times the ESM quota. The ESM would 
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then avoid having to provide solvency support. It would also limit political frictions from the 
mutual dependence of the debtor country and the ESM. Jochen Andritzky argued that limiting 
assistance may undermine the power of ESM to prevent crises. Daniel Gros agreed it is a 
difficult to solve conundrum. In his proposal, support would be unlimited for ‘innocent 
bystanders’, but limited for countries with high debt burdens, although the distinction may be 
difficult to make. A key indicator should be the rollover need, not the debt stock. Jochen 
Andritzky recalled that the idea of a maturity extension at the onset of an ESM program for 
highly indebted countries would achieve a very similar effect.  
Roberto Perotti pointed out the large amounts of funding required by Italy, despite its long 
maturity structure. While it is hard to imagine creditor countries would be willing to finance 
this, a proposal such as the automatic debt restructuring proposed by Germany is not 
acceptable to Italy and other member states.  
Daniel Gros recalled that Italy’s public debt is mostly held domestically and asked – if domestic 
investors do not trust the Italian government and trigger a crisis – why the ESM should step in. 
It may be more appropriate for the ESM to focus on limiting damage from contagion to other 
countries. Jochen Andritzky pointed out that a maturity extension would keep all creditors 
involved, and an ESM macroeconomic stabilisation programme would provide political leverage 
to unblock the necessary reforms to restore solvency. Roberto Perotti highlighted the 
importance of avoiding a collapse of the euro. Pietro Reichlin recalled that the Italian economy 
is sufficiently large and fiscal flows are stable. Therefore, a crisis in Italy would be a liquidity 
crisis, thereby constituting a case for a European intervention. 
Participants agreed that the firepower of the ESM is sufficient to address banking crises, but 
banks remain intertwined with sovereigns. Roberto Perotti argued that the ESM’s firepower 
and procedures are not sufficient to deal with sovereign debt problems. Dirk Schoenmaker 
recalled that crisis prevention should aim to separate banking and sovereign issues, which 
would make crisis arrangements more robust. Tough supervision remains essential in 
preventing moral hazard in banking. Daniel Gros agreed that the ESM has an important role to 
address crises in smaller countries and reduce contagion, contributing to overall stability. 
Asked about governance, Dirk Schoenmaker explained that in his proposal, a euro finance 
minister was not meant to run a big budget, but form a political counterpart, for instance vis-
à-vis the ECB and the SSM, who would be accountable to the European Parliament. Jochen 
Andritzky recalled the privilege the ESM currently enjoys of holding discussions at the level of 
euro area finance ministers in the Eurogroup, which lends it a lot of attention and legitimacy.  
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11 A euro finance minister? 
Guntram Wolff 
Bruegel  
In the vision European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker outlined in his September 
2017 ‘state of the union’ address, the role of a European finance minister would unite those of 
Commission Vice President, chair of the Eurogroup and head of the euro-area portion of the 
EU budget. But this proposal is ill-designed and will create more problems than it solves. 
Such a position is not that of a finance minister and the misnomer could create mistaken 
expectations and confusion. A finance minister can raise taxes, set priorities for spending and 
go to the markets to issue debt. In federal systems, the federal finance minister typically also 
plays a role in overseeing and controlling the fiscal affairs of the different regions. Accordingly, 
a European finance minister will raise great expectations. Some will hope that this ‘finance 
minister’ will be a strict budget enforcer, finally bringing fiscal discipline. Others will look 
forward to tapping new EU fiscal resources. The reality is that Juncker’s finance minister will 
have the power to do neither. 
The proposal is institutionally problematic, as it unduly mixes the role of the Commission with 
that of the Council. The European Union is built on a fine balance between community interests 
and national interests. Essentially, this balance gives the European Commission primacy in 
initiating legislation and in issuing recommendations in the context of Europe’s fiscal rules. 
Meanwhile member states have supremacy in taking final decisions on the rules, and the 
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament have the final say on legislation. 
There are practical considerations, too. The chair of the Eurogroup needs to be accepted by 
the national ministers in order to exercise authority. An appointment by the Eurogroup is 
therefore preferable to imposing a chair from an outside institution. 
Nonetheless, the current set-up is problematic and requires change. Beyond the long-overdue 
reform of Europe’s fiscal rules, institutional reform is needed. The Eurogroup lacks 
transparency. Its president is a national minister, which leads to impossible conflicts; the 
preparation of the Eurogroup president is done by three different institutions; the time 
devoted to chairing such an important gathering requires a full-time position, and there are 
conflicts of interest between the national mandate of the minister and the interests of the euro 
area as a whole. 
Instead of creating an ill-designed European finance minister role, the European Commission 
should therefore propose to make the Eurogroup president a full-time position with a clear 
European mandate. A full-time president should defend European interests in the gathering of 
national ministers. Moreover, she would be the person defending jointly-taken decisions in 
national contexts such as national parliamentary debates. Last but not least, such a full-time 
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president should regularly report and explain Eurogroup decisions to the European Parliament 
– perhaps back-to-back with the President of the European Central Bank, for example. 
Juncker and French President Macron still have a point – Europe needs a discussion on budget. 
The obvious starting point is the EU budget, which should be reformed to reflect European 
priorities in the 21st century. Emmanuel Macron’s list of priorities for common initiatives – such 
as security and defence; border control and migration; research and common climate policies 
– are sensible and widely shared. A reform that would redirect resources from the spending of 
the 20th century, such as the common agricultural policy, to these new priorities is sensible. 
President Juncker’s idea to create specific mechanisms within the EU budget for the euro area 
also deserves serious consideration. It would be unwise to create totally new euro area 
institutions beyond the ESM that would only aggravate the division between countries inside 
the euro area and those outside. Instead, the EU budget itself can provide some useful 
elements towards stabilisation. Some of the EU budget lines could be made more contingent 
on shocks to provide meaningful support. For example, in case of a large inflow of immigrants, 
a member state like Italy should receive support from the EU budget. It is also a good idea to 
create some form of a ‘rainy day’ fund within the EU budget that would be available to help 
countries hit by a strong shock. 
The Commission should focus its energy on reforming the EU budget and making it more useful 
for citizens. It should move away from the creation of an institutionally and politically ill-
conceived finance minister role. Increasing the importance of the position of the Eurogroup 
chair and establishing accountability to the European Parliament will also improve fiscal 
governance of the euro area. 
None of this is an answer to the larger questions on the future of the euro area. To survive and 
prosper, Europe will need to eventually agree on a fiscal union to share risk and complement 
private risk sharing. And above all, the euro area will need to find ways to overcome its deep 
divisions among member states. A union without trust will not be sustainable. Ill-designed 
proposals for a finance minister will not solve any of the underlying issues. 
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Annex: Notes from Virtual Meeting – 19 February 2018 
Presentation by Guntram Wolff, discussion led by Mark Hallerberg 
Participants (alphabetical) 
Jochen Andritzky German Council of Economic Experts 
Mathias Dolls ifo Institute 
Daniel Gros Centre for European Policy Studies 
Mark Hallerberg Hertie School of Governance 
Sam Langfield European Central Bank 
Jörg Rocholl ESMT Berlin 
Guntram Wolff Bruegel 
Jeromin  Zettelmeyer Peterson Institute for International Economics 
 
Mark Hallerberg introduced findings from a text analysis comparison of European Commission 
reports on stability/convergence programmes and the final versions the Council approved 
(Baerg and Hallerberg, 2016). Results available through 2013 show that more member states 
received weakened final texts from the Council prior to the financial crisis. By country, in the 
period 1998 to 2009, the Council weakened reports covering France, Greece, Portugal, and Italy 
the most. He interpreted this period as one where the Commission served as a watchdog, but 
the member states used the Council to water down the most critical comments. 
In his view, the reforms of 2011/12, which introduced reverse qualified majority voting among 
other modifications, changed the nature of the game. The Commission has become more 
political. If the previous model was that the Commission was a watchdog and the member 
states added the political element, the question today is who should be the watchdog. Finding 
a more effective watchdog was the gist of the ‘Schäuble proposal’. Mark Hallerberg agreed that 
the ESM is not a good option. He also agreed that one should simplify the rules the Commission 
has to enforce. However, he questioned whether an elevated president of the Eurogroup, being 
inherently political, could deliver the more ‘technocratic’ decisions that are now mostly lacking. 
Instead, he favours another body to serve as watchdog. The European Fiscal Board (EFB) could 
be elevated to take that role as it already looks at European aggregates concerning the fiscal 
stance of member states. But there may be other institutional problems, and he agreed that 
distance from the Commission would be one of them. 
Guntram Wolff reiterated that it would be inconceivable that a Commissioner could also serve 
as a president of the Eurogroup, mixing the Commission’s role in developing judgment 
proposals with the Eurogroup’s (or the Council’s) role as a decision-maker. In that sense, a third 
institution could play an important role, although in the current setup, the EFB remains too 
close to the Commission. A suitable combination could be a Eurogroup chair, appointed from 
within and confirmed by the European Parliament, with fiscal surveillance resting with the 
Commission or the EFB. 
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Jeromin Zettelmeyer wondered whether a Eurogroup president without a euro area budget or 
borrowing capacity stands any chance of bringing about an optimal fiscal stance across the euro 
area. Guntram Wolff responded that the best solution would consist of a federal body with the 
power to tax and spend. The second best option would be improved coordination of national 
fiscal policies.  
Participants discussed how helpful a borrowing capacity would be in achieving a more optimal 
fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole. Daniel Gros asked whether such a mechanism would not 
simply distribute previous contributions pro rata. Guntram Wolff emphasised that a borrowing 
capacity could ease budget (or funding) constraints of member states with little fiscal space. 
However, this would still require national coordination, as other member states might adjust 
their fiscal stance in response. Having a full-time Eurogroup president would just be a small 
step towards improved coordination without any guarantee of an improved fiscal outcome.  
Jeromin Zettelmeyer added that a common borrowing capacity would allow a euro finance 
minister to send cheques to member states and this might help somewhat in achieving a more 
optimal fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole. However, this approach crosses a red line. 
Sam Langfield agreed that a borrowing capacity would make much more of an impact than 
establishing a full-time Eurogroup chair. Guntram Wolff pointed out that a common borrowing 
capacity would only help countries with funding constraints, creating an asymmetry. Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer recalled an idea, raised in the recent Franco-German proposal (Bénassy-Quéré et 
al., 2018), that a reform of fiscal rules alongside instruments such as a rainy day fund or easier 
ESM access to lessen funding constraints could facilitate a more optimal fiscal stance. While 
the proposal sees a full-time chair of the Eurogroup as one way to improve coordination, it 
does not envision the establishment of a common borrowing capacity.  
Jochen Andritzky recalled that some member states – like France – strongly believe in the need 
for a strong authority to preside over the Eurogroup, with political leverage to forge 
compromises. To enhance its standing, the position would be called finance minister. While he 
doubts whether this would work, he also points out that negotiating a more optimal fiscal 
stance for the euro area will always be contentious: member states may not wish to diverge 
from their nationally optimal fiscal stance to compensate for other member states lacking fiscal 
space. Guntram Wolff emphasised that without appropriate powers to raise taxes and make 
spending decisions, the head of the Eurogroup should not be called a finance minister. 
However, the chairperson can influence the outcome of decisions. To elevate the standing of 
the Eurogroup chair, they could be elected by the Eurogroup, confirmed by the European 
Parliament, and appear in Parliament regularly for hearings.  
In further discussion, Jeromin Zettelmeyer noted that for the no-bailout rule to become 
credible, the ESM requires institutional strengthening. This includes separating it more clearly 
from political influence, providing it with more independence, and strengthening its 
accountability vis-à-vis agreed rules and structures. Guntram Wolff agreed to these governance 
issues, but also alluded to the changes introduced in the IMF’s lending policies in the case of 
Greece. The DSA should be technical, but typically becomes very political. In his view, only by 
reducing its consequences can the credibility of the no-bailout clause be improved. 
Institutionally, it is sensible to foresee the bundling of functions like programme design and 
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monitoring as well as financial support at the ESM. The current setup consisting of ESM, 
European Commission, ECB, and the IMF can only agree on the lowest common denominator. 
Yet, keeping the IMF on board also makes sense. 
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